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OUTSOURCING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Kishanthi Parella∗ 
Abstract: This Article addresses the problem of preventing human rights violations 
abroad that result from the globalization of business. It specifically explores the challenge of 
improving labor standards in global value chains. The modern business has changed 
dramatically and has “gone global” in order to court foreign markets and secure resources, 
including labor. Familiar household names, such as Nike and Apple, have “outsourced” 
many of their functions to suppliers overseas. As multinational buyers, they dominate one 
end of the global value chain. At the opposite end of the value chain are the local managers 
and owners of the factories and workhouses where tablets are assembled, running shoes are 
made, and gowns are sown. These facilities are often the sites of serious human rights 
violations, such as forced labor and child labor. 
Some actors have attempted to rein in transnational corporate misconduct through 
litigation in domestic courts regarding the corporation’s actions abroad. However, after 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, it is unclear how successful such strategies will prove in 
the future. This Article takes a different approach and focuses on preventing these human 
rights violations by improving labor practices in global value chains. Unfortunately, current 
approaches focus on encouraging better due diligence regarding the behavior of their 
suppliers. These approaches rely on auditing, monitoring, and disclosures and have 
dominated international (UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework), national (Danish 
Act on Financial Statement), and sub-state (California’s Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
of 2010) efforts to combat human rights violations. However, this Article explains that these 
and similar efforts will have limited effects because of the problem of misaligned incentives 
between buyers and suppliers in global value chains. Suppliers have different business 
profiles, interests, and constraints compared to their multinational buyers. Therefore, 
conventional drivers for better labor practices that rely on reputational risks and consumer 
boycotts will not work for suppliers. Instead, public actors and other stakeholders must 
identify incentives that are appropriate for suppliers. Second, they must also adopt a reflexive 
law governance approach in order to transmit these incentives effectively in global value 
chains. This Article concludes by offering examples of strategies that public actors should 
adopt in order to prevent another Foxconn or Rana Plaza tragedy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The key problem for international business law in this new 
millennium is the effective regulation of the global, fragmented firm.1 
Globalization has enabled corporate entities to span continents and 
establish dominions previously reserved for kings and statesmen. But 
whereas rules of international law evolved to curb the excesses of these 
latter types of actors, there is today a lack of similar rules to contend 
with this century’s new titans. This is the reason that many global firms 
operate in this unregulated space between national borders. 
Although a variety of national laws and corporate policies may speak 
to environmental and labor standards that businesses should abide by, 
these businesses enjoy a multitude of options regarding the structure of 
their operations. Their functions—from product concept, development, 
manufacturing, sales, shipping, and customer service—can be distributed 
across a variety of actors and several continents so that no two functions 
occur in the same place. This freedom allows businesses to escape the 
dictates of national regulation in favor of a less regulated space. As a 
result, headlines are filled with stories of corporate wrongdoing, 
including the tragedies at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh and Foxconn in 
China. According to the U.N. Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights John Ruggie, 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament 
today lies in the governance gaps created by globalization - 
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, 
and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse 
consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive 
environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds 
without adequate sanctioning or reparation.2 
As a result, public actors and other stakeholders around the world have 
been confounded as to how to respond when the causes and effects of 
such crises are separated by an ocean. 
1. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 501 (2009); Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous 
Improvement in the Global Workplace (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Grp., Paper No. 21, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
262178. 
2. U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights Council, 189 U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Framework]. 
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This Article argues that the solution to the “governance gap” is for 
stakeholders to adopt the very strategy at the root of the transnational 
governance challenge: outsource. The advantage of outsourcing for the 
business sector is that it allows companies to delegate and distribute 
roles among several actors in a manner that avoids duplication of efforts, 
capitalizes on the functional advantages of the actors, and adds value 
through a progression of steps. Firms like Nike and Apple chose to focus 
on a narrower set of core competencies that better reflected their 
specialized skills and the activities they believed would garner the most 
value. This outsourcing also made it more difficult for government 
actors to control giants like Nike and Apple because of geographic 
constraints, jurisdictional limitations, capacity, resources, and proximity. 
The solution, therefore, may be for government actors and other 
stakeholders to adopt the approach that businesses followed when faced 
with similar constraints: fragmentation according to functional 
specialization where the efforts of stakeholders are sequentially aligned 
in a series of value-adding activities. 
The effective governance of transnational business activities requires 
that actors match the outsourced structure of the modern firm with an 
outsourced approach to regulating the fragmented firm. “Outsourced 
regulation” requires decentralization along two key dimensions: 
incentives and governance. The first dimension of decentralization 
relates to the model of the firm that stakeholders aim to regulate: 
unitary-actor model or fragmented-firm model. Decentralization along 
this dimension requires acknowledging that not all the actors in the 
global value chain are the same. In fact, these actors have different 
interests, business profiles, and constraints. Incentives for cooperation, 
therefore, must speak to this diversity in the value chain.3 
However, designing incentives for all the actors in the value chain is 
not enough. Stakeholders must also have an effective way of 
transmitting those incentives to the relevant actors. The second 
dimension of decentralization, therefore, relates to the governance 
choices stakeholders face regarding how to transmit incentives in the 
value chain. One significant reason that current laws and standards speak 
to the interests of some, but not all, of the actors in the value chain is 
because of the challenge of transmitting incentives across a diverse 
group of actors who are geographically separated, culturally distinct, and 
often have very different business profiles. Any government actor will 
3. George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 241, 267 (2010) (examining the problem of aligning incentives in outsourced relationships). 
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be severely limited in their ability to offer incentives to such a diverse 
group. As a consequence, many government actors simply target one end 
of the value chain because it is within their jurisdictional reach. 
However, this is a more significant problem for “centralized” forms of 
governance, such as command and control regulation, that rely on one 
dominant actor, such as the state. This problem can be overcome by 
shifting to a decentralized approach to governance that involves a variety 
of stakeholders. 
There are two main “decentralized” options for transmitting 
incentives in the global value chain: network coordination or reflexive 
coordination. Transnational regulatory networks have arisen as a forum 
for actors—usually from the sub-state level—to interact with one 
another to share information, harmonize standards, and improve 
enforcement efforts.4 These networks have tackled issues such as 
securities regulation, banking supervision, insurance, and the 
environment.5 However, a number of features of networks make this an 
inappropriate setting for government actors and other stakeholders to 
develop strategies for enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
norms in global value chains. 
Instead, government actors should consider using reflexive law as a 
way to coordinate their activities. Reflexive law is an approach to 
regulation that avoids direct intervention in favor of establishing 
procedures and policies that are intended to encourage the target industry 
to adopt a socially desirable course of conduct.6 The significance of this 
approach for current practices is that public actors should differentiate 
between target and intermediate actors. If they cannot directly 
incentivize a target actor (such as a factory manager located overseas), 
they should identify an intermediate actor who possesses leverage over 
the target actor and exercise their leverage over that intermediary actor. 
Reflexive law approaches are part of a broader strategy of new 
4. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 
257, 290–91 (2011); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 
40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 290 (2004) [hereinafter Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power]; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated 
Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1053 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Global Government 
Networks]; see also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of 
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 284–85 (1998). 
5. Zaring, supra note 4, at 282; see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International 
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 
1, 12 (2002). 
6. David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 
25 J. CORP. L. 41, 48–51 (1999); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1264 (1995).  
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approaches to governing the modern firm, including encouraging 
government actors to persuade indirectly where before they commanded 
directly.7 
The critical insight offered by this Article is that responses to 
tragedies like Foxconn and Rana Plaza will fail if they do not 
decentralize along both of these dimensions. This insight is intended for 
those government actors who are championing a new generation of CSR 
strategies that seek to reform the value chain through heightened 
transparency.8 For example, in California, the Transparency in Supply 
Chains Act of 2010 requires that covered firms publicly disclose the 
nature and extent of their supplier monitoring.9 California’s approach is 
part of a broader strategy to address human rights violations in value 
chains by forcing corporations to disclose in the hope that such 
disclosures will encourage them to know and act regarding what goes on 
in their value chains.10 Denmark, for example, has also mandated similar 
social reporting,11 and the European Commission is considering 
adopting similar standards.12 The United Nations also introduced the 
Guiding Principles that are intended to implement the Protect, Respect, 
Remedy Framework, including the corporate responsibility to respect.13 
All these initiatives attempt to improve transparency and consumer 
knowledge of the value chain and thereby increase monitoring and 
7. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 520–21; David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate 
Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development, 18 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 447, 450 (2008). See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and 
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Susan 
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 458 (2001). 
8. See Meredith R. Miller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Working Conditions in the Global 
Supply Chain: Accountability Through Transparency in Private Ordering (October 20, 2013) 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342756. 
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012). 
10. See Sabel, et al., supra note 1, at 16–17. 
11. See Karin Buhmann, The Danish CSR Reporting Requirement as Reflexive Law: Employing 
CSR as a Modality to Promote Public Policy (Univ. of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 2011-36, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1964220. 
12. European Commission, Environmental OREP, Commission to Propose Mandatory Company 
Reporting of Environmental and Social Performance (Aug. 8, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
environment/resource_efficiency/news/up-to-date_news/08032013_en.htm.  
13. U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, Report of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, 
U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie). 
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oversight by businesses of the practices of their suppliers. 
This Article illustrates the weaknesses of these approaches by 
illustrating the problem of misaligned incentives between buyers and 
suppliers in the value chain. Current due diligence standards concerning 
the value chain offer incentives that are more appropriate for the model 
of a single, integrated firm rather than the present reality of a diversity of 
actors operating in a global value chain. These approaches privilege the 
interests of one end of this value chain (the end in the developed world) 
to the neglect of the other actors in the chain. The assumption is that the 
business that the government is targeting is in a position to determine 
outcome (achieve compliance) and therefore the government tailors the 
incentives for cooperation to these actors. But the global value chain for 
a U.S. business can now involve several layers of suppliers. At one end 
is a multinational buyer, such as a large brand-name firm. At the 
opposite end of the value chain are the local managers and owners of the 
factories and work-houses where tablets are assembled, running shoes 
are made, and gowns are sewn. These facilities are often the sites of 
serious human rights violations, such as forced labor, child labor, and 
environmental contamination.14 Effective CSR strategies require 
acknowledging the interests and constraints of buyers and suppliers in 
these global value chains. 
It is true that the California approach acknowledges the global value 
chain structure by requiring firms to perform due diligence on their 
suppliers and disclose their efforts.15 But the incentives for cooperation 
with California’s mandate are suited to the firms within their jurisdiction 
but not the other actors in the value chain. As a result, the incentives 
offered in these approaches do not apply equally to all the parties in the 
chain and therefore exert limited “pull” on all the different actors. 
Admittedly, firms that operate in California, such as multinational brand 
and retail firms, often enjoy more power in the value chain than other 
actors and therefore may be in a better position to influence cooperation 
from their suppliers. But even if their suppliers do not have much power, 
they are not completely powerless. In fact, they often possess just 
enough power to resist these top-down approaches to corporate social 
responsibility. This resistance takes many forms. Some suppliers 
respond to more robust standards by further “outsourcing” their 
workforce in favor of temporary, contract labor who receive less legal 
14. See CHARLES KERNAGHAN, THE NAT’L LABOR COMM., CHILD LABOR IS BACK: CHILDREN 
ARE AGAIN SEWING CLOTHING FOR MAJOR U.S. COMPANIES 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports/child-labor-is-back. 
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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protection. The ability of suppliers to hide their transgressions is 
facilitated by the willing ignorance of many of their multinational 
buyers. When on-site inspections do occur, suppliers counteract this 
threat by orchestrating the process to provide a false image of 
compliance. Through these and similar strategies, suppliers continue to 
maintain current practices and display little motivation to improve 
conditions. These are among the reasons that increased monitoring and 
auditing by corporate actors will not lead to the results desired. 
Supplier audit evasion is a product of the subordination of supplier 
interests in the incentive structures of international, national, and private 
CSR initiatives. In these various approaches, there is an underlying 
assumption of harmony of interests among the variety of actors who 
operate in the modern global value chain. However, we are no longer 
dealing with a vertically integrated business. The different firms that 
operate in the global value chain have varying—even conflicting—
interests and differ in location, size, capacity, and functional specialties. 
It is these interests and the resulting cost/benefit calculations that 
determine these actors’ receptivity or resistance to improving CSR. 
Disproportionate attention to multinational buyers (such as large brand 
name retailers in the developed world) foster conclusions that media 
exposure, consumer boycotts, and other forms of reputational risks can 
secure better practices in global value chains. However, suppliers (such 
as local factory owners and managers in overseas facilities) are 
motivated by other sets of factors. The incentives that would secure their 
cooperation in improving standards vary from those of their 
multinational customers. Moreover, they are the parties who are “on the 
ground” and can determine the degree of implementation of improved 
CSR.16 The real challenge is adequately incentivizing them to adopt 
better practices, and that requires formulating an incentive structure that 
speaks to all actors in the chain and not just one end. Failure to do so 
results in tension along the value chain, whereby downstream consumers 
and retail firms demand better production methods but upstream 
suppliers resist changes and simply hide the extent of their violations. 
This Article makes the following significant contributions. First, it 
examines the largely understudied phenomena in legal scholarship of 
global value chains and the challenges of the global, fragmented firm 
that has outsourced and off-shored many of its functions. This is a 
significant project because the problem studied in this Article—labor 
16. Stephanie Barrientos & Sally Smith, Do Workers Benefit from Ethical Trade? Assessing 
Codes of Labour Practice in Global Production Systems, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 713, 720 (2007). 
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standards in global value chains—is a manifestation of a greater problem 
confronting business law: devising an incentive structure that is 
applicable to the modern, transnational business. As such, the problems 
diagnosed in this Article, and the solutions offered, apply not only to the 
issue of improving corporate social responsibility but also to issues 
surrounding governance of a business that has outsourced many of its 
functions. 
This Article’s second contribution is the explanation of why the new 
wave of CSR strategies, which emphasize disclosure, monitoring, and 
audits will have limited effect. This is an important insight because a 
number of jurisdictions (such as California and Denmark) have already 
adopted this approach and it may become the template for future public 
responses in Europe and the United States.17 This Article seeks to reform 
these strategies by clarifying the reasons why human rights abuses occur 
in the value chain. Section II distinguishes between asymmetries of 
information and asymmetries in rent and risk. This distinction is 
significant because it identifies the limitations of the current CSR 
strategies that seek to improve monitoring and disclosure and, therefore, 
only address the first problematic asymmetry. By providing an 
alternative explanation of the problem and exploring the understudied 
issue of supplier interests, it highlights the weaknesses of current 
incentives and offers suggestions on the types of incentives that would 
improve CSR strategies. 
Finally, this Article begins a normative conversation regarding the 
types of approaches that public actors should support in order to reform 
problematic value chains. It does not claim to provide a solution for 
eliminating all abuses from all value chains. Instead, its objective is 
more modest: identify the flaws of the current approaches and explain 
the importance of decentralization in response to value chain problems. 
Section III introduces the two dimensions of decentralization—
incentives and governance—and explains the importance of each and the 
problems that arise when one or more dimensions are centralized as 
opposed to decentralized. Although it will not eliminate all abuses, 
decentralization will improve the effectiveness of CSR initiatives, 
especially those involving brand firms. Section IV sketches the types of 
CSR strategies that emerge from a decentralized approach. This section 
also reveals that a decentralized approach to CSR resembles the 
fragmentation of industries that public actors are attempting to regulate. 
17. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text; Hess, supra note 7, at 447 (“Overall, social 
reporting is on the verge of becoming a mainstream phenomenon.”). 
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The organizational mirroring of the regulators and the regulated aids the 
former in overcoming many of the challenges of regulating a 
fragmented, heterogeneous, transnational value chain. 
I. THE AGE OF OUTSOURCING 
Many readers own an Apple iPhone, iPad, or similar gadget. 
However, most people do not know where these products are made. At 
one end of Apple’s value chain are the “upstream suppliers,” such as 
local managers and factory owners, who manufacture the iPhones, iPods, 
and iPads. They are “upstream” in the global value chain because they 
are the ones who supply the goods that are destined for Apple and 
consumers later down in the chain. At the other end of the value chain 
are the “downstream buyers,” such as Apple, who purchase the goods 
manufactured by the suppliers and, in turn, sell them to consumers. The 
following Section provides an overview of global value chains that is 
useful for understanding the interests and attitudes of Apple’s suppliers. 
Section A describes the shift to outsourced production, and Section B 
provides an example of the types of human rights problems that 
outsourcing can cause. 
A. Rise of the Fragmented Firm 
Apple is a corporate behemoth. It became so, in part, by mastering the 
global value chain.18 It is one of many American firms that abandoned 
vertical integration of their production in favor of a model that connects 
multiple tiers of firms of varying sizes, specialties, and geographic 
locations.19 Previously, vertical integration of production occurred when 
a firm assumed the tasks associated with taking a product from concept 
to the end-user—including design, manufacturing, testing, packaging, 
and marketing. Although this form of organization had dominated the 
early part of the past century, it has been steadily challenged by an 
alternative model that largely externalizes manufacturing tasks (as well 
as an increasing array of functions) to outside firms (either domestically 
or internationally).20 Under this alternative approach, product innovation 
is separated from product manufacturing, so that those who design the 
18. Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-
the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
19. See Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 283, 294–95 (2013). 
20. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm 
Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 434 (2009). 
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products are seldom the same parties who actually assemble them.21 
Instead, a growing class of “contract manufacturers” take over the 
production tasks for firms so that firms can focus on other activities that 
are better suited to their skill set or result in higher returns. Broad swaths 
of industry have shifted to this outsourced model as familiar household 
names divest their production facilities and increasingly rely on overseas 
suppliers. 
Why do firms choose to outsource and send abroad what they used to 
do at home? Answering this question harks back to Ronald Coase’s 
theory of firm organization in The Nature of the Firm.22 All firms—
whether they are globally oriented or not—confront the same dilemma: 
do they internally produce their own inputs or contract with external 
parties to do the same work? According to Coase, transaction costs help 
firms answer this question and, consequently, demarcate the boundary of 
the firm.23 The transaction costs involved with contracting (negotiation, 
coordination, etc.) lead firms to produce internally what they can 
outsource externally.24 However, internal production is not free from 
transaction costs either. Instead, firms face declining returns to 
management that result from higher production costs and internal 
inefficiencies.25 Firms navigate these competing risks so that the 
“optimal location of economic activity is the result of a careful balance 
between production cost savings from using markets, and transaction 
cost savings (again, broadly defined) from using firms.”26 Further 
complicating this calibration is the reality that transaction and 
production costs are not fixed but fluctuate according to many factors, 
such as new technologies.27 As a result, “the borders of a firm will 
continue to change as the underlying tension between production costs 
and transaction costs oscillates.”28 
These considerations mean that firms confront several choices 
regarding the organization of their production when they court foreign 
21. Victoria Curzon Price, Some Causes and Consequences of Fragmentation, in 
FRAGMENTATION 88, 88 (Sven Arndt & Henry Kierzkowski eds., 2001) (“‘Fragmentation’ refers to 
the growing complexity of the modern chain of production, which divides and redivides previously 
integrated systems into ever more specialized and distinguishable units.”). 
22. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
23. Id. at 390. 
24. Id. at 390–91.  
25. Id. at 394; Geis, supra note 3, at 245–46. 
26. George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 955, 971 (2007). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 970–71. 
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markets and labor pools. They may choose to establish their own 
production plants in overseas locations for a number of perceived 
advantages. For example, they may prefer to control production out of a 
desire to protect proprietary technology and knowledge or due to other 
business advantages that may be compromised through too much 
decentralization.29 For such reasons, firms may decide to retain all the 
economic activities “under one ownership roof” even if these processes 
could be subcontracted and despite the fact that production occurs in 
more than one country.30 The inability to separate production into 
discrete tasks or to communicate production knowledge to a supplier 
also precludes such externalization.31 
Alternatively, firms may prefer not to own the facilities in which their 
products are made or assembled and may instead opt to work with 
various independent actors in the production process through a series of 
market transactions. The choice to do this is facilitated by decreasing 
transaction costs that result from lower transportation costs, improved 
electronic communication, and trade liberalization.32 Due to the internet, 
“[a] business executive will know, as never before, what is available, at 
what price, in what quantity, to what quality, when and where—at a 
click of a button.”33 These declining market costs may therefore “reduce 
the advantage of internalizing activities within the firm, and therefore 
reduce its size, forcing it to ‘outsource’ all but its core activities.”34 
Novel contracting arrangements also lead to new possibilities for 
cooperation at the boundary of the firm.35 These two possibilities 
29. Price, supra note 21, at 95. 
30. Id. at 95. 
31. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Khalid Nadvi, Clusters, Chains and Compliance: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Governance in Football Manufacturing in South Asia, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 201, 
204 (2010) (explaining that in the literature on global value chains, “the specific governance 
outcome in a given value chain is determined by the capability of suppliers, the nature and 
complexity of the transaction involved, and the ability to which information can be codified”). 
32. Geis, supra note 26, at 960–62 (“Relatively high transaction costs have historically prevented 
firms from tapping into the global supply of labor. As these costs drop, however—through 
improvements in communication, digitization, standardization, and the like—it becomes economical 
for firms to embrace overseas production. In essence, falling interaction costs have unlocked a 
massive supply of labor, driving down the price of economic inputs, realigning business processes, 
and tempting (or forcing) managers to move production outside the firm.” (citations omitted)). 
33. Price, supra note 21, at 100. 
34. Id. 
35. See Geis, supra note 26, at 962 (“[B]usiness outsourcing has thrived in recent years not only 
because globalization has unlocked inexpensive production markets, but also because it is becoming 
easier for firms to monitor and prevent the agency costs of outsourcing.”); Gilson et al., supra note 
20, at 435. 
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constitute opposite poles of a spectrum upon which a firm can arrange its 
level of integration with those who manufacture its products.36 
Apple eventually chose to go with the second route (or close to it)37 
and this production model has contributed to Apple’s emergence as one 
of the world’s most successful corporate giants. The product that helped 
get Apple to that enviable pinnacle is the iconic iPhone: a pretty, usable, 
affordable piece of the future that allows the user to access every mode 
of communication—all within the convenience of their own palm. This 
product defined the “smartphone” industry, which in turn defined a 
generation of texters, tweeters, and social-networking aficionados. 
Although the iPhone and its peer smartphones rest within the hands of 
many in the United States, these products are not made here. Instead, the 
components are sourced from a number of countries and many hands—
mostly foreign—help build each individual iPhone. Apple’s success is 
partially due to its ability to coordinate the manufacture of such a 
sophisticated product in an even more sophisticated value chain 
involving various actors and several continents. This value chain has 
many characteristics, each of which will be discussed in turn below. 
1. Spatial Dispersion 
Most of the components of an iPhone are not made in the United 
States.38 Instead, an estimated ninety percent of iPhone components are 
manufactured abroad:39 Germany and Taiwan supply the advanced 
semiconductors, Korea and Japan supply the memory, Korea and 
Taiwan provide the display panels and circuitry, Europe provides the 
chipsets, and Africa and Asia supply the rare metals.40 China does the 
rest and puts it all together.41 Apple does employ 43,000 workers in the 
United States,42 but this figure does not reflect Apple’s true work 
force—the one that produces the millions of Apple iPods, iPhones, and 
36. See Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, supra note 31, at 204. 
37. Marcelo Prince & Willa Plank, A Short History of Apple’s Manufacturing in the U.S., WALL 
STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/12/06/a-short-history-of-apples-
manufacturing-in-the-u-s/. 
38. P.K., Slicing an Apple, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/ 
dailychart/2011/08/apple-and-samsungs-symbiotic-relationship [hereinafter Slicing an Apple]. 
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other products that Apple sells annually. Instead, a staggering 700,000 
additional foreign workers are employed by Apple’s contractors, such as 
Foxconn.43 
Why are Apple’s products made overseas and not in the United 
States? Most Americans believe that the location of manufacturing 
abroad is due to wage differences between American workers and their 
foreign counterparts. This is only a part of the truth. Labor costs are only 
a small fraction of the cost in technology manufacturing.44 In theory, 
therefore, Apple could pay American wages and still secure considerable 
rewarding margins.45 What it cannot find in the United States are the 
scale and flexibility offered by foreign plants.46 A story relating to 
Apple’s former leadership, Steve Jobs, is revealing. In 2007, Mr. Jobs 
demanded an unscratchable glass screen for the iPhone.47 And he wanted 
it in six weeks.48 There was only one location that could deliver on Mr. 
Jobs’ demand: China. In China, subsidies from the government had 
aided the glass-cutting factories so that the factories could offer Apple 
warehouses filled with glass samples and skilled engineers.49 And they 
offered it all to Apple for free or next to free.50 The owners of the 
Chinese factories had also built dormitories on site so that “employees 
would be available 24 hours a day.”51 How could Apple say no? 
According to a former Apple executive, 
The first truckloads of cut glass arrived at Foxconn City in the 
dead of night . . . . That’s when managers woke thousands of 
workers, who crawled into their uniforms — white and black 
shirts for men, red for women — and quickly lined up to 
assemble, by hand, the phones. Within three months, Apple had 
sold one million iPhones. Since then, Foxconn has assembled 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (“In part, Asia was attractive because the semiskilled workers there were cheaper. But that 
wasn’t driving Apple. For technology companies, the cost of labor is minimal compared with the 
expense of buying parts and managing supply chains that bring together components and services 
from hundreds of companies.” (emphasis added)). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (“It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad. Rather, Apple’s executives believe the vast 
scale of overseas factories as well as the flexibility, diligence and industrial skills of foreign workers 
have so outpaced their American counterparts that ‘Made in the U.S.A.’ is no longer a viable option 
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over 200 million more.52 
The ability to scale up and down quickly was especially important for 
Apple because it had experienced difficulties in the past with responding 
to changes in consumer demands.53 
Additionally, Apple could not find the pool of skilled workers that it 
needed for its assembly lines. The company had projected a need for 
8,700 industrial engineers to supervise the staff of 200,000 assembly line 
workers needed for making the iPhones.54 Apple’s analysts “forecast[ed] 
it would take as long as nine months to find that many qualified 
engineers in the United States. In China, it took 15 days.”55 Additionally, 
regulatory competition tends to favor Chinese markets. China boasts 
“flexible land-use, labour, and environmental rules” so that “China can 
erect a massive operation in no time at all, staffed with compliant labour 
and with little concern about the impact of the factory on watersheds, air 
quality, and traffic.”56 This contributes to one of China’s chief 
advantages: the ability for Apple to scale its production up and down 
rapidly.57 
Re-shoring Apple’s manufacturing work back to the United States 
would therefore require significant changes in both national and global 
economies.58 Securing a reliable pool of the relevant skilled labor is only 
part of the challenge. Another challenge is that supply chains for 
consumer electronics are concentrated in Asia.59 A U.S. firm, therefore, 
must decide between manufacturing in the United States and shipping 
the component to its customers in Asia—an option that involves long 
delays and considerable cost—or constructing an overseas plant next to 
its customers in Asia. It is not a surprise that many U.S. firms choose the 
52. Id. 
53. Gilson et al., supra note 20, at 464. After registering a $740 million quarterly loss, Apple sold 
its largest U.S. production facility to SCI, an electronics contract manufacturer. SCI used the former 
Apple plant and Apple workers to manufacture Apple’s products, as well as products made by other 
firms. This arrangement freed Apple from carrying unnecessary overhead and inventory costs. The 
electronics industry could be characterized by a great deal of volatility in consumer demand, which 
meant that production scheduling was difficult. Out-sourcing manufacturing meant that retailers and 
brand firms no longer had to internalize the costs associated with rapid changes in demand. Timothy 
J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of Industrial Organization, 11 
IND. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 456–58 (2002). 
54. Duhigg & Bradsher, supra note 39. 
55. Id. 
56. R.A., Supply Chains: Apple and the American Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/01/supply-chains [hereinafter Supply Chains]. 
57. See Duhigg & Bradsher, supra note 39 (discussing the benefits of Asian supply chains). 
58. Id. 
59. Supply Chains, supra note 56.  
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second option: 
It’s possible to coordinate a supply chain that’s draped across an 
archipelago of Asian economies. To maximise the return to this 
chain, however, it’s still necessary to keep plants reasonably 
close together. A plant located in America is too distant from 
Asia to make much economic sense . . . . Changing 
transportation and communication technologies facilitated a shift 
in manufacturing to Asia, then reinforced its presence there.60 
2. Functional Specialization and Value Added 
Globalization of production does not only mean that production 
occurs in many countries. It also refers to the functional specialization of 
actors in different locations and the integration of these disparate 
economic activities into a cohesive production plan. Industrial 
“fragmentation” is based upon division of labor among a variety of 
actors, and the product cycle for the iPhone is distributed across a 
variety of different firms. 
Each step in the production of an Apple iPhone 4 may be undertaken 
by different companies in different countries.61 The “value added” at 
each step of the production process is the difference between the cost of 
the inputs and the value of the outputs.62 In Apple’s value chains, “each 
producer purchases inputs and then adds value, which becomes a cost of 
the next stage of production. The sum of the value added by everyone in 
the chain equals the final product price.”63 
The value chain for another Apple product, the iPod, involves 
component suppliers who produce low-value parts, such as capacitors 
and resistors.64 They account for a small share of the total value in the 
value chain and the risk of close substitution leads to fierce competition 
that exerts a downward pressure on the prices they can charge and the 
profit margins they can secure.65 Some of the components are high-
value, such as visual displays, hard drives, and key integrated circuits.66 
60. Id. 
61. Slicing an Apple, supra note 38. 
62. Hal R. Varian, Who Really Makes the iPod?, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/technology/28iht-ipod.1.6378095.html. 
63. JASON DEDRICK ET AL., ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION INDUSTRY STUDIES CONFERENCE, 
WHO PROFITS FROM INNOVATION IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS?: A STUDY OF THE IPOD AND 
NOTEBOOK PCS 1, 6 (2008), available at http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/Dedrick_Kraemer_Linden.pdf. 
64. Id. at 7–8. 
65. Id. at 7. 
66. Id. 
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These components garner a significant share of the value added because 
they “are the most likely to embody proprietary knowledge that helps to 
differentiate the final product and to command a commensurately high 
margin.”67 These various components are assembled into a final product 
by an original design manufacturer (ODM) or a contract manufacturer 
(CM), such as Foxconn, Flextronics, Solectron, Quanta, and Compal.68 
These assembly firms also compete fiercely for high-volume orders and 
this competition limits the margins they can secure.69 
Brand-name vendors, such as Apple, supply the lion’s share of the 
value added to the value chain. They undertake high-value tasks such as 
product concept, branding, and marketing.70 As the lead firm in the iPod 
value chain, Apple “contribute[s] market knowledge, intellectual 
property, system integration and cost management skills, and a brand 
name whose value reflects its reputation for quality, innovation, and 
customer service.”71 Finally, global wholesalers and national and local 
distributors undertake distribution services, while large retail chains and 
general retailers sell the final products to consumers.72 
Firms choose to divide up labor because, first, it allows them to focus 
on what they do best. Nike, an early architect of this model of global 
production, chose to leave the manufacturing to its external suppliers 
because, in the words of one of its executive, “‘[w]e don’t know the first 
thing about manufacturing.”73 Instead, Nike’s strength was in branding 
and marketing, “entail[ing] the construction of a convincing world of 
symbols, ideas, and values harnessing the desires of individuals to the 
consumption of athletic shoes.”74 Similarly, Apple does not manufacture 
or assemble the components of its iPod, iPhone, or iPad. Instead, it 
focuses on strategy, product design, branding, and marketing.75 The 
result of this configuration of the global value chain is that the higher 







73. Miguel Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike and the Global 
Athletic Footwear Industry, in COMMODITY CHAINS & GLOBAL CAPITALISM 247, 252 (Gary Gereffi 
& Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994). 
74. Id. at 251; see also id. at 260. 
75. Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 7. 
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chain and not in the manufacturing process.76 
Second, and critically, the reason that market leaders like Apple and 
Nike decided to focus on certain tasks and outsource the rest is because 
this division of labor allowed these firms to focus on “higher-returns” 
segments of global production. For example, 
[t]he real value of the [Apple] iPod doesn’t lie in its parts or 
even in putting those parts together. The bulk of the iPod’s value 
is in the conception and design of the iPod. That is why Apple 
gets $80 for each of these video iPods it sells, which is by far the 
largest piece of value added in the entire supply chain. Those 
clever folks at Apple figured out how to combine 451 mostly 
generic parts into a valuable product. They may not make the 
iPod, but they created it. In the end, that’s what really matters.77 
Finally, division of labor allowed Nike and Apple to adapt their 
sourcing strategies depending on changing labor costs and skill-level 
needed for their different products.78 For example, the manufacture of an 
iPhone depends on several discrete tasks, but not all the tasks may 
require the same skill level. Apple, therefore, could source the low-skill, 
low-cost components from one location but ensure that the few high-
value components are manufactured by higher-skill, high-cost workers.79 
3. Separation of Ownership and Control 
Although retailers and brand firms in North America may no longer 
own the means of production, this does not mean that they have 
relinquished control over the global value chain or the other actors in the 
76. Supply Chains, supra note 56 (“[A]s one scales up production of Apple products, there are 
vastly different employment needs across the supply chain. So, it doesn’t take lots more designers 
and programmers to sell 50m iPhones than it does to sell 10m. You have roughly the same number 
of brains involved, and much more profit per brain. On the manufacturing side, by contrast, 
employment soars as scale grows. So as the iPhone becomes more popular, you get huge returns to 
the ideas produced in Cupertino, and small returns but hundreds of thousands of jobs in China.” 
(emphasis added)); see also Dong-Sook S. Gills, Globalization of Production and Women in Asia, 
581 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 108 (2002); Richard M. Locke et al., 
Complements or Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour 
Standards in Global Supply Chains, 51 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 519 (2012).  
77. Varian, supra note 62; see also Supply Chains, supra note 56. 
78. Korzeniewicz, supra note 73 at 260. 
79. The fragmentation of large, U.S.-based firms has also affected the evolution of suppliers in 
foreign countries. As the former shed functions, the latter developed competencies in these areas 
and often expanded in order to match the skill and scale of production required by their buyer firms. 
Sturgeon, supra note 53. This reactionary growth facilitates greater fragmentation because firms 
may be tempted to outsource more of their functions as the quality of an industry’s supplier base 
increases. Id. at 455. 
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process. Instead, buying firms exercise tremendous power over suppliers 
despite their lack of direct ownership.80 For example, as the lead firm in 
the iPod value chain, Apple is the dominant player.81 Apple is the “only 
company that bargains with all other actors in the value chain” and “[i]n 
every relationship with its suppliers, Apple has the greater market 
power.”82 
Like many other multinational buying firms, Apple’s power derives 
from a combination of large volume orders, retail concentration, and 
substitution possibilities. A high concentration of buyers gives these 
firms the ability to dictate favorable conditions to their suppliers, 
including exerting a strong downward pressure on prices and demanding 
greater turnaround times.83 The threat of substitution looms over the 
various tiers of Apple’s value chain and not even the high-value 
component manufacturers are invulnerable to this risk. For example, 
U.S. company PortalPlayer made the primary microchip that managed 
the iPod’s functionality.84 The component was valuable enough to the 
iPod that PortalPlayer secured a gross margin of 44.8 percent in 2005.85 
However, as important as PortalPlayer was to Apple, Apple was even 
more important to PortalPlayer: “In 2005, Apple’s subcontractors for 
iPod assembly accounted for 93 percent of PortalPlayer’s sales.”86 
PortalPlayer’s vulnerability was further compounded because “Apple 
[was] no more than one product revision (about 18 months) from being 
able to replace even a key supplier like PortalPlayer with acceptable 
switching costs.”87 In fact, that is what Apple did. In 2006, “Apple 
began designing iPods without PortalPlayer’s processors in them. The 
chip company fell on hard times and was acquired by Nvidia, another 
chip company.”88 If the supplier of a high-value component confronted 
such substitution risks, imagine the substitution risks faced by the 
various suppliers who produce low-value components for the iPod. Even 
80. Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global Supply Chains, 
48 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24, 25 (2012) (describing modular, relational, and captive governance 
strategies in global supply chains). 
81. Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 15. 
82. Id. at 16; see also Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East 
Asia, 12 J. ASIAN BUS. 75, 83 (1996). 
83. Stephanie Barrientos, Contract Labour: The ‘Achilles Heel’ of Corporate Codes in 
Commercial Value Chains, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 977, 982 (2008). 
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large contract manufacturers like Foxconn, who assemble the Apple 
products, are not immune: “As with key components, Apple would incur 
some switching costs to change manufacturing service providers. 
However, these costs can be minimized by synchronizing them with a 
product revision, hence the power in the relationship is once again 
mostly on Apple’s side.”89 
The power wielded by Apple and other powerful multinational buyers 
allow them to demand lower costs and faster turnaround times. Both of 
these factors are important for understanding the conditions at Foxconn 
and other overseas production sites. Most suppliers in Apple’s value 
chain are only permitted a slim profit margin; therefore, the managers at 
these suppliers “push their employees to work longer and faster.”90 
However, low costs are only part of the story. The rest is due to 
consumer preferences and the business model that it cultivates. In the 
United States and other developed economies, consumers demand new 
electronics on an annual basis.91 This means that a company’s success 
depends upon its ability to satisfy consumer preferences for the next 
shiny bauble:  
Apple lost billions of dollars in market value [in 2012] because it 
couldn’t produce enough handsets to meet record demand, one of 
several factors that precipitated a 20 percent decline in its share 
price at the end of last year. That only underscored the 
importance of speed in the supply chain to Apple 
executives . . . .92 
Apple responds, therefore, by pushing Foxconn and its other suppliers 
to churn out newer models in significant volume and in record time.93 
According to critics of Apple’s value chain,  
[c]ompliance will not be easy as long as Apple’s existing 
business model remains unchanged. The evidence from other big 
consumer brands suggest that most abuses of workers—
particularly when it comes to overtime—occur when a factory is 
89. Id. at 15. 
90. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18. 
91. Id.; see also Apple’s China Supply Chain Exposed: Interview by Kai Ryssdal with Charles 
Duhigg, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/apple-economy/ 
apples-china-supply-chain-exposed (“Ryssdal: If change is going to come, where is change going to 
come from? Duhigg: . . . We live in a time when there’s a brand-new device, it seems like, every 
couple of months. And they’re amazing and wonderful – but there’s a price to that.”). 
92. Cam Simpson, An iPhone Tester Caught in Apple’s Supply Chain, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-07/an-iphone-
tester-caught-in-apples-supply-chain. 
93. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18. 
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under pressure to meet a sudden surge in demand, often around 
product launches.94  
For example, when Apple’s marketing chief unveiled the iPhone 5 on 
September 12, 2012, few units had been produced.95 However, the 
phone was scheduled to become available for sale in nine different 
markets in nine days.96 Apple’s aggressive “production-and-launch 
schedule” meant that its supplier—Flextronics—had to intensify its own 
value chain to meet Apple’s scheduling and volume demands.97 
The result of this cost pressure and time pressure is the grueling 
environment reported in “sweatshops” around the world, including at 
Foxconn’s large contract manufacturing facility near Shenzhen, China. 
B. The Tragedy at Foxconn 
Foxconn Technology Group (“Foxconn”) is the world’s leading 
contract manufacturer of electronics.98 Its customers include Apple, 
Dell, Sony, and Nokia.99 However, it is now better known for the series 
of suicides that occurred at its facilities in 2010. During 2010, several 
workers leapt off buildings at Foxconn’s site near Shenzhen.100 This 
Foxconn facility is possibly the world’s largest production facility with 
over 300,000 workers.101 The facilities that Foxconn maintains in China 
are not like average production sites. Its workers eat and sleep at these 
facilities. This business model of taking over the lives of the workers is 
not unusual and is instead the usual practice for many of China’s low-
cost manufacturers.102 Due to features of Chinese law, migrant workers 
are at the mercy of their employers, and not the government, for housing 
and services. Citizenship in China is linked to birthplace and so the local 
governments in the manufacturing districts in China often deny needed 
94. M.B., Apple and Foxconn: iAudit, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/03/apple-and-foxconn. 
95. Simpson, supra note 92. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Pun Ngai & Jenny Chan, Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn 
Experience, 38 MODERN CHINA 383, 385–86 (2012). 
99. Kathrin Hille, Suicides Put Foxconn Model Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (May 23, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a4d15856-66ca-11df-aeb1-00144feab49a.html#axzz2jsMkzDbI. 
100. Jason Dean & Ting-I Tsai, Suicides Spark Inquiries, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704026204575267603576594936. 
101. Hille, supra note 99. 
102. Richard Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein, A New World of Retail Supremacy: Supply 
Chains and Workers’ Chains in the Age of Wal-Mart, 70 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 106, 
110 (2006). 
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services to the migrant workers.103 Therefore, migrant workers are 
dependent upon their employers for housing and that is why large 
dormitories are often situated adjacent to working facilities in these 
areas.104 Of course, this dynamic only exacerbates the power of the 
factory owners and managers, who resort to tactics such as withholding a 
worker’s identity papers until the worker fulfills the contract with the 
employer.105 
One contributing factor to Foxconn worker exhaustion was Foxconn’s 
drive to deliver orders in short delivery times.106 The quick turn-around 
was part of Foxconn’s strategy to compete and claim business away 
from its more established competitors.107 It was also an adaptation to the 
production schedules demanded by their customers—including Apple 
and Nokia—who wanted their products quickly in order to satisfy global 
demand for their products: “The corporations pressure Foxconn so that 
they can compete against each other on price, quality, and delivery. To 
fulfill the requirement of speedy production and shipment deadlines, 
Foxconn transfers the work pressure to the frontline workers.”108 The 
Longhua factory could produce more than ninety iPhones per minute.109 
These production feats were achieved due to conditions like the 
following: “Management used stop-watches and computerized industrial 
engineering devices to test the capacity of the workers and if workers 
being tested were able to meet the quota, the target would be increased 
day by day until the capacity of the workers reached the maximum.”110 
Unfortunately, this also had the effect of pushing its workers to and past 
their breaking point. 
In the wake of public scrutiny, Apple joined the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) in 2012 and promised to align its compliance 
program with FLA obligations.111 Apple also terminated its relationship 




106. Ngai & Chan, supra note 98, at 388. 
107. Id. at 387, 400. 
108. Id. at 400. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Apple Joins FLA, FAIR LAB. ASS’N (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/ 
apple-joins-fla. The FLA conducted an independent investigation of Foxconn’s facilities in China 
and reported a completion rate of approximately ninety-nine percent on remediation items. Final 
Foxconn Verification Status Report, FAIR LAB. ASS’N (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.fairlabor.org/ 
report/final-foxconn-verification-status-report. 
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code of conduct.112 In 2013, Apple even decided to break Foxconn’s 
monopoly over iPhone assembly and include a different supplier, 
Pegatron Corp., more prominently in its value chain.113 Apple’s reasons 
for doing so were at least partially informed by pricing decisions. Public 
scrutiny of Foxconn led the supplier to improve working conditions and 
therefore reduce its cost advantages from scale.114 Some analysts 
speculate that the supplier change may be motivated by Pegatron’s 
willingness to accept thinner margins, which will likely lead to 
downward pressure on wages and conditions for Pegatron’s workers.115 
Finally, Foxconn decided to change the composition of its assembly-line 
workers by including up to 10,000 new robots on its factory floor in 
order to meet new iPhone production quotas.116 
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: TWO COMPETING TALES 
OF CAUSATION 
Identifying the solutions to problems like Foxconn requires that 
stakeholders first understand the problem accurately. There is a 
temptation in developed economies—from buyers to politicians to 
media—to diagnose tragedies such as Rana Plaza and Foxconn as 
consequences of asymmetries of information in the value chain: These 
abuses occur because the multinational buyer is often unaware of the 
choices and conduct of its overseas supplier. This leads to the familiar 
challenge of managing the agency-cost problem in corporate activity. 
This implicit or explicit diagnosis of the problem has led to reliance on 
monitoring and audits as means of discouraging suppliers from engaging 
in human rights abuses, such as the initiatives adopted in California and 
Denmark.117 This diagnosis of the problem is prevalent because it 
accords with the buyer’s perspective on value chain abuses: “it’s them, 
not us.” Given the relative power of buyer voices over their suppliers, it 
112. Connie Guglielmo, Apple’s Supplier Labor Practices in China Scrutinized After Foxconn, 
Pegatron Reviews, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2013, 7:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
connieguglielmo/2013/12/12/apples-labor-practices-in-china-scrutinized-after-foxconn-pegatron-
reviewed/. 
113. Eva Dou, Apple Shifts Supply Chain Away from Foxconn to Pegatron, WALL STREET J. (May 
29, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323855804578511122734340726. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Michael Coffey, Foxconn May Soon Rely on Robots Over Humans for Apple’s iPhone 6, 
MARKET WATCH (July 7, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2014/07/07/ 
foxconn-may-soon-rely-on-robots-over-humans-for-apples-iphone-6/. 
117. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text. 
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is not surprising that the problem is presented as one relating to control 
of supplier conduct in the value chain. Section A elaborates on this 
viewpoint and explains why the CSR strategies that it inspires will be 
unsuccessful. 
However, as discussed in Section B, asymmetries of information are 
only a part of the problem. From the perspective of the suppliers, they 
fall short of human rights standards because of asymmetries in rent and 
risk that characterize many value chains: The value gained in the chain is 
directed toward the buying end while the risks involved are directed to 
the suppliers. This results in a situation where suppliers cannot 
simultaneously satisfy the sourcing demands and CSR standards of 
buyers. As a consequence, therefore, suppliers will frustrate buyers’ 
attempts at monitoring and resist efforts at improvement. The solution to 
addressing this challenge is not to engage in more auditing. Instead, it 
depends on appealing to the interests of the suppliers and incentivizing 
them to cooperate. 
A. Explaining Foxconn—The Buyer’s Tale: Asymmetries in 
Information 
One way to understand the events at Foxconn is to attribute them to 
the lack of information that the buyer, Apple, and other stakeholders 
have regarding what occurs at overseas sites such as Foxconn. The 
danger of this lack of information is that it contributes to the agency-cost 
problem that plagues many areas of corporate activity: “The agency cost 
problem arises whenever one party (the agent) has discretionary power 
to make decisions that affect the wealth of another (the principal).”118 
The challenge is that the “very act of deputizing someone else to run 
your affairs raises incentives for suboptimal behavior.”119 
The agency-cost problem also plagues the global value chain. The 
chain is based on one party, such as a multinational buyer, contracting 
with another firm to perform activity that the buyer previously 
performed within its own firm. When it does so, it creates a situation 
where the “outsourcing vendor controls the activity, while the 
outsourcing firm ‘owns’ the result.”120 In other words, Apple is in a 
situation where Foxconn controls production activities and related 
functions—including the treatment of the workers who produce Apple’s 
goods—but the backlash against Foxconn’s practices are directed at 
118. Geis, supra note 26, at 974. 
119. Id. at 973. 
120. Id. at 962. 
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Apple, who faces the consequences of Foxconn’s choices. 
1. Addressing the Agency-Cost Problem: Monitoring 
A significant cause of the agency-cost problem is asymmetrical 
information between the agent (supplier) and the principal (multinational 
buyer).121 It is difficult for the principal to adequately protect itself 
against the agent’s behavior because the principal may have limited 
means to become aware of it.122 It is no surprise, therefore, that one 
method that outsourcing firms have adopted to address the agency-cost 
problem is to contractually require vendors to subject themselves to 
monitoring performed by the outsourcing firm (buyer) or a third party 
designated by the outsourcing firm.123 
Some of the most well-known contractual codes of conduct are those 
included in supply contracts between a company based in the United 
States and its overseas manufacturers. For example, HP’s Supplier 
Social & Environmental Responsibility Agreement states that suppliers 
are “responsible for identifying any areas of its operations that do not 
conform to HP’s Supplier Code of Conduct and HP’s General 
Specification for the Environment,” as well as “implementing and 
monitoring improvement programs designed to achieve” these 
standards.124 The agreement also gives HP the right to progress reports 
and the right to records for verification of the information in the 
supplier’s reports.125 
One significant limitation of private codes of conduct is that 
downstream firms did not adequately monitor compliance with their own 
codes.126 Ineffective monitoring meant that that there was little 
motivation for upstream suppliers to change current practices. 
Due to this limitation, public actors attempted to increase the 
monitoring and oversight responsibilities of upstream firms towards 
their downstream partners. For example, the Securities & Exchange 
Commission adopted a rule mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
121. Id. at 974. 
122. Id. at 979. 
123. Id. at 993. 
124. HP Supplier Social and Environmental Responsibility Agreement, HEWLET-PACKARD (Oct. 
22, 2008), http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supagree.pdf. 
125. Id. 
126. In a study of 246 codes, only ten percent had a formal complaint body and less than fifty 
percent had any type of penalty or consequence for violation. Mark B. Baker, Promises and 
Platitudes: Towards a New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 123, 133 (2007). 
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act that requires firms to “disclose 
their use of conflict minerals that originated in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) or an adjoining country.”127 Examples of such conflict 
minerals include gold, tungsten, and tin.128 If the conflict minerals 
originated in the DRC or one of its neighbors, the firm must “undertake 
due diligence on the source and chain of custody of its conflict minerals” 
and must also file a Conflict Minerals Report.129 Firms subject to this 
rule must not only provide the required information to the SEC but must 
also make their disclosures available to the public on their website.130 
Another example is the 2012 executive order issued by President 
Obama that is intended to prevent human trafficking and forced labor in 
federal contracting.131 Federal contracting regulations will be amended 
in order to ban certain “trafficking-related” activities by federal 
contractors, subcontractors, and their employees.132 Examples of 
prohibited activities include “misleading or fraudulent recruitment 
practices; charging employees recruitment fees; and destroying or 
confiscating an employee’s identity documents, such as a passport or a 
driver’s license.”133 Compliance programs are also mandatory for federal 
contractors and subcontractors working under larger contracts abroad.134 
Sub-state actors have also been active in attempting to address supply 
chain issues. Under the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 
2010, 
Every retail seller and manufacturer doing business in this state 
and having annual worldwide gross receipts that exceed one 
hundred million dollars ($100,000,000) shall disclose, as set 
forth in subdivision (c), its efforts to eradicate slavery and 
human trafficking from its direct supply chain for tangible goods 
127. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict 
Minerals (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm 
[hereinafter SEC Press Release]. 
128. Id. 
129. Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058#.VAd7PGMVM4g. 
130. Id. 
131. Exec. Order No. 13627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60029 (Sept. 25, 2012). 
132. Fact Sheet: Executive Order Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in 
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offered for sale.135 
Specifically, firms covered by the law must disclose the extent to which 
it (1) verifies product supply chains “to evaluate and address risks of 
human trafficking and slavery,”136 (2) audits suppliers to evaluate 
compliance with firm standards regarding trafficking and slavery,137 (3) 
“[r]equires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the 
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking 
of the country or countries in which they are doing business,”138 (4) 
“[m]aintains internal accountability standards and procedures,”139 and 
(5) trains employees and management on human trafficking and 
slavery.140 These disclosures must be available on the seller or 
manufacturer’s website.141 If the firm does not maintain a website, it 
must provide a written disclosure within thirty days of receiving a 
written request for disclosure from a consumer.142 
At the international level, the United Nations has also reinforced the 
importance of monitoring as a means to address abuses by suppliers in 
the value chain. For example, the most recent U.N. effort to combat 
corporate misconduct is the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework 
proposed by U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights John Ruggie.143 Perhaps the most novel contribution of this 
framework is the recognition of the “corporate responsibility to respect,” 
which requires that companies refrain from infringing on the rights of 
others.144 The foundation of this responsibility is due diligence, 
understood as “a process whereby companies not only ensure 
compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of human rights 
harm with a view to avoiding it.”145 
A company’s responsibility for due diligence includes evaluating: (a) 
the “country contexts in which their business activities take place, to 
highlight any specific human rights challenges they may pose,” (b) 
“human rights impacts their own activities may have within that context 
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012). 
136. Id. § 1714.43(c)(1). 
137. Id. § 1714.43(c)(2). 
138. Id. § 1714.43(c)(3). 
139. Id. § 1714.43(c)(4). 
140. Id. § 1714.43(c)(5). 
141. Id. § 1714.43(b). 
142. Id. 
143. Framework, supra note 2, at 9. 
144. Id. at 8. 
145. Id. 
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- for example, in their capacity as producers, service providers, 
employers, and neighbours,” and (c) “whether they might contribute to 
abuse through the relationships connected to their activities, such as with 
business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State 
actors.”146 According to the “Ruggie Framework,” appropriate due 
diligence should include formulating a firm-specific human rights 
policy, impact assessments, integration of the human rights policy 
throughout the firm, and tracking performance through monitoring and 
auditing.147 
The overarching theme of these diverse efforts is to increase the due 
diligence responsibilities of downstream firms regarding their sourcing 
practices.148 
2.  The Limits of Monitoring: Resistance and Tension Along 
the Value Chain 
The problem with the monitoring efforts described above is that they 
do not overcome the problem of asymmetric information that 
characterizes the agency-cost problem. This is because upstream 
suppliers engage in a variety of practices that undermine the 
effectiveness of oversight by downstream buyers. 
First, many workers do not know what is being evaluated when social 
auditors inspect the sites. In one study, although eighty percent of 
respondents knew of external auditor inspections, a very small number 
knew that the purpose of the auditor’s visits was to evaluate labor 
standards and work conditions.149 The rest did not know the purpose or 
believed that the audits were related to production safety and quality.150 
Managers themselves may be unaware of the objectives of factory audits 
or the benefits of improved conditions and this lack of awareness 
reduces the likelihood that they will be willing to invest in change.151 
Second, upstream suppliers manipulate the auditing process, thereby 
146. Id. at 17. 
147. Id. at 18. 
148. Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations 
Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights 
Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 371 (2012). 
149. Anita Chan & Kaxton Siu, Wal-Mart’s CSR and Labor Standards in China 20 (The Int’l 
Research Network on Bus., Dev. & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 4, 2009), available at 
http://bdsnetwork.cbs.dk/publications/Working%20Papers/bsd_working_paper_(paper4).pdf. 
150. Id. 
151. Daniella Gould, The Problem with Supplier Audits: Understanding How and Why Chinese 
Factories Circumvent Codes of Conduct, 2 CORP. RESP. MGMT. 24, 25–26 (2005). 
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giving a false appearance of compliance. A social audit occurs when a 
firm submits its corporate accountability standards to verification. The 
auditors use a combination of interviews, document review, and visual 
inspection in order to evaluate the firm’s compliance with its own 
standards.152 One concern with private codes is that downstream firms 
do not actually monitor compliance with their codes, leading to 
continued violations and little incentive for change.153 
A number of the world’s most prominent brand names now proudly 
advertise the fact that they regularly audit their suppliers. However, this 
increased monitoring function may not actually identify violations or 
improve conditions. The following story from Bangladesh illustrates 
some of the limitations of external monitoring. Walmart and JC Penney 
were among several companies that were criticized for their use of child 
laborers in a Bangladesh factory known as Harvest Rich.154 Some of the 
children used in this factory were as young as eleven years old and were 
routinely assaulted and forced to work shifts exceeding twelve hours.155 
Even more unfortunate than the conditions at Harvest Rich was the fact 
that the factory had been inspected. In fact, not only was Harvest Rich 
inspected but it had been certified by the Worldwide Responsible 
Apparel Production Group (WRAP).156 A WRAP certification signifies 
that the factory is “in ‘full compliance’ with all human and worker rights 
laws and international standards.”157 So, how did WRAP miss the fact 
that 200–300 children were exploited at the factory, including routine 
beatings and substandard pay? In the words of one of the young girls 
who worked at Harvest Rich: “‘When buyers come, we [the child 
workers] are kept in the bathroom.’ They make us hide ‘because we are 
little, because we are kids.’”158 
Upstream suppliers are able to manipulate the auditing process for a 
number of reasons. Audits are often announced in advance and this 
provides local owners and managers with time to give the appearance of 
compliance to the visiting auditors.159 Higher quality social audits can 
152. Sasha Courville, Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic 
Governance?, 25 L. & POL’Y 269, 273 (2003). 
153. Baker, supra note 126, at 133–34. 
154. KERNAGAHN, supra note 14, at 1. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 37. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 12. 
159. Gould, supra note 151, at 28; Peter Lund-Thomsen, The Global Sourcing and Codes of 
Conduct Debate: Five Myths and Five Recommendations, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 1005, 1013 (2008). 
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also be time intensive, involving interviews with several varieties of 
stakeholders (management, workers, worker representatives, health and 
safety officers).160 The preference of some workers for off-site 
interviews also increases the time required for audits.161 Despite this 
need for time, auditors may only stay for periods of time short enough 
for managers to maintain the façade.162 Some suppliers even erect walls 
to hide non-compliance or ensure that production occurs off-site at 
facilities that will not be inspected.163 
Local management also controls communication between workers 
and social auditors by prohibiting open conversation, selecting which 
workers will provide information, and even coaching workers in their 
answers.164 A prevalent “management-bias” in the industry ensures that 
most information is obtained from managers as opposed to their 
workers.165 Double book keeping also prevents auditors from making an 
accurate assessment because they only receive the set of records that 
local management wants them to see.166 Suppliers keep false sets of 
records and logs to “hide evidence of actual excessive overtime, 
improper payment of wages, and otherwise adverse working 
conditions.”167 Additionally, suppliers have improved their ability to 
maintain duplicitous practices and are further assisted by professional 
consultants who advise on such deception.168 
160. Courville, supra note 152, at 276. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. 
163. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, Supplier Evasion of a Buyer’s Audit: Implications for 
Auditing and Compliance with Labor and Environmental Standards 3 (Draft Working Paper, 2014). 
164. Chan & Siu, supra note 149, at 5; Ngai-Ling Sum & Pun Ngai, Globalization and 
Paradoxes of Ethical Transnational Production: Code of Conduct in a Chinese Workplace, 9 
Competition & Change 181, 194 (2005); Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 3; see also 
Timothy Bartley, Standards for Sweatshops: The Power and Limits of Club Theory for Explaining 
Voluntary Labor Standards Programs, in 110 VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY 
APPROACH 128 (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009). 
165. Barrientos & Smith, supra note 16, at 716; Courville, supra note 152, at 275. 
166. Barrientos, supra note 83, at 980; Michael E. Blowfield & Catherine S. Dolan, Stewards of 
Virtue? The Ethical Dilemma of CSR in African Agriculture, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 1, 13–14 (2008); 
Bin Jiang, Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains: Process Explanations 
from Theoretic and Empirical Perspectives, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 77, 88 (2008). 
167. Dexter Roberts et al., Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 26, 
2006), available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-11-26/secrets-lies-and-sweatshops 
(according to one compliance manager, “the percentage of Chinese suppliers caught submitting 
false payroll records has risen from 46% to 75% in the past four years” and “estimates that only 
20% of Chinese suppliers comply with wage rules, while just 5% obey hour limitations”); Plambeck 
& Taylor, supra note 163, at 3. 
168. Gould, supra note 151, at 25, 27–28; Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 3; Roberts et 
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The result is that “an imperative for transparency and accountability 
can instead produce secrecy and deception.”169 Auditing issues are 
further compounded when auditors are not trained in the necessary skills 
for social auditing or do not even speak the same language as the 
workers at the audited factories.170 Increasing the costs of deceptive 
behavior can be an important improvement, but the result may just be 
that suppliers ultimately fail the audit if they cannot hide their violations. 
Failing an audit exposes them to the risk of termination, which results in 
a situation where the workers who were previously exploited are now 
unemployed. Furthermore, the risk of termination, and the economic 
results for workers, can result in a problematic alliance between 
management and workers to present an appearance of compliance with 
corporate codes.171 Such a situation makes it even more difficult for the 
lead firm and external auditors to determine the situation on the ground. 
Third, suppliers often turn to workers who enjoy little to no protection 
under national laws or corporate standards.172 In order to contend with 
downward pricing and increasingly fluctuating demand for products, 
contract manufacturers have tended to employ women, minorities, and 
migrant labor because individuals from these groups are less likely or 
able to assert their rights.173 Contract manufacturers have also turned to 
contract labor in order to reduce overhead and to hire and fire as needed 
based on demand.174 Contract laborers receive far less protection from 
public actors (national employment legislation) and private actors 
(corporate codes of conduct).175 The conditions of contract laborers 
escape the notice of social auditors because of the short duration of the 
auditor visits, unfamiliarity with local employment practices, and a 
failure to consult with contract labor.176 
al., supra note 167. 
169. Blowfield & Dolan, supra note 166, at 14. 
170. Id.; Courville, supra note 152, at 276. 
171. Sum & Ngai, supra note 164, at 197–98; Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 3. 
172. Stephanie Barrientos & Andrienetta Kritzinger, Squaring the Circle: Global Production and 
the Informalization of Work in South African Fruit Exports, 16 J. INT’L DEV. 81, 85 (2004). 
173. See Barrientos & Smith, supra note 16, at 722–23; Locke et al., supra note 76, at 526; Ngai 
& Chan, supra note 98, at 386 (“As migrant workers, Foxconn workers enjoy little labor protection 
in the society at large and suffer from a heightened work pressure and desperation in the workplace 
that lead to suicides on the one hand but also daily and collective resistance on the other hand.”). 
174. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 526. 
175. Blowfield & Dolan, supra note 166, at 6–7; see also Barrientos, supra note 83, at 982–83; 
Locke et al., supra note 76, at 532 (explaining how many national laws do not protect contract 
laborers and, consequently, how suppliers structure their employment practices to prevent workers 
from becoming full-time). 
176. Barrientos, supra note 83, at 980. 
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Contract laborers are less likely to assert their rights because they are 
often staffed from different agencies, rendering it more difficult for 
union organizers to coordinate the efforts of these workers.177 Thus, 
although a corporate code may proclaim a lead firm’s commitment to 
freedom of association, the increasing majority of that firm’s workforce 
is not entitled to that right or cannot effectively exercise it. Contract 
laborers are also less likely to organize given that they can be easily 
terminated because of the short-term and contractual nature of their 
employment.178 As supplier workforces are concentrated outside the 
supplier and in temporary staffing agencies, it becomes important to 
include these agencies in the CSR compliance monitoring. However, 
there is a risk that downstream suppliers will either not supply the 
agencies staffing their production lines with compliance codes or will 
not ensure that the agencies conform to the codes.179 A number of local 
governments in China have also taken to dispatching students to “intern” 
at Foxconn factories.180 This pool of labor “has become an enormous 
worker community in Foxconn factories across the country.”181 By 
formatting this working arrangement as an internship (and not 
employment), the students are not protected under China’s Labor Law, 
not entitled to trade union membership, and any resulting disputes are 
not treated as labor disputes.182 
It is important to remember that a number of corporate codes of 
conduct take national laws as their substantive standard and simply 
require that their suppliers adhere to those laws in their operation. This 
results in a double-negative effect when workers—such as students—do 
not fall within the protection of those national laws. When these workers 
fall outside the protection of the law, private codes simply reinforce this 
exclusion. 
Although this Article focuses on the limitations of monitoring caused 
by resistance from upstream suppliers, the auditing model has been 
criticized for other weaknesses as well. One concern is that auditing—as 
a form of “regulation by numbers”—prioritizes a quantitative approach 
to public values that may be inappropriate for social issues such as 
177. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 526. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 534. 
180. Lance Whitney, Apple’s Chinese Suppliers Still Exploiting Workers, Says Report, 
CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 27, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/apples-chinese-
suppliers-still-exploiting-workers-says-report/. 
181. Ngai & Chan, supra note 98, at 391. 
182. Id. 
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human rights. This is because of a risk that indicators may lead to better 
performance on issues that are easier to quantify, thereby neglecting 
other equally significant issues because of the difficulties involved in 
measuring the latter.183 Secondly, the use of indicators encourages a 
“box-ticking” approach to compliance that leads to a prioritization of the 
number of disclosures as opposed to their accuracy or role in promoting 
actual improvement.184 Finally, there are concerns regarding the quality 
and conflict of interests of many of the firms performing auditing 
services.185 
B. Explaining Foxconn—The Supplier’s Tale: Asymmetries in Rent 
and Risk 
As the previous section explained, increasing the number of audits 
does not reduce the number of tragedies. After all, Apple increased the 
number of facilities it audited between 2007 and 2010 from thirty-nine 
to 102,186 but this rise did not prevent the series of suicides that occurred 
in 2010. The reason that monitoring efforts oftentimes have limited 
success is because the asymmetrical flow of information is only a partial 
explanation of events such as the suicides at Foxconn. Instead, human 
rights abuses at overseas sites are also explained as a result of 
asymmetrical flows in rent and risks that are not addressed by 
monitoring efforts. This is why the current wave of corporate social 
responsibility reforms—heavily based on increased monitoring and due 
diligence—will have a limited impact on the lives of overseas workers. 
1. Caught in the Middle: The Tension Between Corporate Social 
Responsibility Policies and Procurement Practices 
The tenth suicide at Foxconn in 2010 occurred days before Apple’s 
global launch of its iPad to countries other than the United States.187 
Apple’s response was to reaffirm its “commit[ment] to ensuring that 
conditions throughout our supply chain are safe and workers are treated 
183. Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability 
Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575, 611 (2013). 
184. Id. at 581, 606–08. 
185. Id. at 610. 
186. Business: Core and Periphery; Supply Chains in China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2010, at 83. 
187. Workers Urged Not to Kill Themselves; Asked to Sign Contracts with Promise, WINDSOR 
STAR (May 27, 2010), http://www2.canada.com/windsorstar/news/story.html? 
id=19fffdd5-40ee-4b51-9dfb-04fe8d083ab4. 
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with respect and dignity.”188 The problem is the tension between this 
professed commitment and the business model that Apple adopts. Apple 
relies on a “lean and flexible” supply chain.189 This results in more 
production per worker being required on a fluctuating timeline. As a 
consequence, “suppliers often try to cut corners, replace expensive 
chemicals with less costly alternatives, or push their employees to work 
faster and longer.”190According to an executive whose company assisted 
with bringing the Apple iPad to market, “[t]he only way you make 
money working for Apple is figuring out how to do things more 
efficiently or cheaper.”191 But the problem for the suppliers, according to 
the same executive, is that Apple will “come back the next year, and 
force a 10 percent price cut.”192 Much of supplier resistance, therefore, is 
fueled by the inability of upstream suppliers to meet the purchasing 
demands of multinational buyers while also adhering to the CSR 
practices espoused by these same buyers. According to a former Apple 
executive, “You can set all the rules you want, but they’re meaningless if 
you don’t give suppliers enough profit to treat workers well . . . . If you 
squeeze margins, you’re forcing them to cut safety.”193 
The value chain is skewed in favor of Apple and other multinational 
buyers so that the benefits of the arrangement accrue to one end—in the 
developed economies—while the risks are relegated to the other end.194 
After all, Apple secured significant profits from its product launch of the 
iPhone in 2007. These profits were helped by the mystery that shrouded 
the iPhone prior to its launch and the significant scale-up that allowed 
188. Id. 
189. Stephen Foley, Apple Admits It Has a Human Rights Problem, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 14, 
2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/apple-admits-it-has-a-human-rights-problem-
6898617.html. 
190. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18. 
191. Id. 
192. Id.; see also Bartley, supra note 164, at 127–28 (discussing similar issues in the apparel 
industry); Xiaomin Yu, Impacts of Corporate Code of Conduct on Labor Standards: A Case Study 
of Reebok’s Athletic Footwear Supplier Factory in China, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 523 (2007) 
(discussing similar issues with Reebok’s procurement practices). 
193. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18. 
194. See, e.g., Barrientos, supra note 83, at 982 (“Suppliers are thus caught in a Catch 22 
situation, where they have to deliver on quality (and associated value) which is passed up the value 
chain, whilst cost and risk is being passed down the chain. These risks and costs are often passed 
down to workers—particularly casual and contract labour who are the weakest link in the chain.”); 
Barrientos & Kritzinger, supra note 172, at 83 (“Hence, within global value chains, risk and 
uncertainty are passed downwards, whilst economic rents are passed upwards. This has important 
implications for labour.”); Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global 
Footwear Industry’s Evolving Governance Structure, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 144 (2008). 
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Apple to meet consumer demand for the products.195 
But this marketing technique has a price. It was obtained because 
hundreds of Chinese workers staffed assembly lines in long shifts. The 
pay-off for this strategy was not evenly distributed as the lion’s share of 
the value from the chain was secured by Apple.196 However, the risks 
associated with this marketing strategy—meeting a large volume of 
orders in a short time period while meeting quality standards—were 
borne by overseas suppliers and their assembly line workers. 
Instantaneous communications between retailer buyers and their 
suppliers mean that the former pressure the latter to meet fluctuating and 
demanding production and shipping schedules. In the words of one of 
the managers at a Dongguan company, “We are forced to apply the labor 
codes . . . but we can judge from our intuition that when production and 
codes clash, which side we can cling to.”197 One reporter commenting on 
another tragedy—this one at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh—diagnosed the 
problem aptly: “Every player has motives to look the other way. The 
retailers ignore the subcontracting because they would rather manage 
fewer big contracts, and the per-piece price of garments falls with bigger 
orders. Suppliers don’t turn down giant orders because they fear they 
will be shut out of future jobs.”198 This is the tension in the global value 
chain that leads to the forms of supplier resistance discussed above and 
that jeopardizes corporate social responsibility objectives. 
The gains from fragmentation have not been shared equally among all 
the actors who participate in global value chains. The prospect of lower 
costs, greater responsiveness to demand, and short production schedules 
are some of the key attractions of fragmentation for multinational buying 
firms such as Apple. However, these same characteristics extract a high 
cost from the workers who labor at the other end of the value chain. 
Significant downward pressure on pricing decreases the margins that 
upstream suppliers can recover, leading them to pay their workers less 
and work them more. According to one critic, voluntary codes of 
conduct “involve[] a tension between buyers and retailers 
simultaneously striving to maximize the value they extract from the 
195. See Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 2012, at A1. 
196. See Slicing an Apple, supra note 38; Dedrick et al., supra note 63. 
197. Appelbaum & Lichtenstein, supra note 102, at 120. 
198. Vikas Bajaj, Doing Business in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/opinion/sunday/doing-business-in-bangladesh.html; see also 
Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 148 (“As long as Nike used purely economic standards for 
selecting and maintaining supplier relationships, the resulting fragile buyer–manufacturer link 
would not support the CSR goals.”). 
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chain, whilst selling competitively priced goods that meet high 
specifications in relation to both product and social standards.”199 This 
reluctance to absorb the cost of compliance means that upstream 
suppliers will be the ones who will ultimately pay for improving 
conditions.200 Given that a number of them already find it difficult to 
secure a satisfactory profit margin, it is unlikely that they will cut further 
into their margin by investing in CSR. Instead, they will more likely 
continue to find loopholes in existing initiatives and maintain current 
practices or they will fail their audits, exposing themselves and their 
workers to unemployment. 
2. Addressing Asymmetries in Rent and Risk 
A significant reason for the limitations of monitoring and disclosure 
efforts is that they are intended to address asymmetries in information 
but not to ameliorate the asymmetries in rent and risk discussed above. 
The failure to address this latter category of asymmetries encourages 
suppliers to frustrate attempts at auditing and other efforts to address 
asymmetries of information. The end result is that practices do not 
change. 
It is important for public actors to recognize the different varieties of 
asymmetries that characterize the global value chain. This is because the 
identified asymmetries give rise to the solutions that these public actors 
adopt to reform the value chain. Disproportionate attention to only one 
type—asymmetries of information—has led California and other 
jurisdictions to encourage increased monitoring through audits. 
Unfortunately, given the dynamics of value chain discussed above, these 
steps will not necessarily increase the buyer’s access to accurate 
information or improve the supplier’s actual practices. 
In order to improve conditions in the value chain, public and other 
actors must address asymmetries in information as well as asymmetries 
in rent and risk. The shift in focus from the former to the latter signifies 
a parallel shift from auditing suppliers to engaging suppliers by creating 
incentives for cooperation. After all, incentives are another way to 
address asymmetries of information and ameliorate the resulting agency-
cost problem.201 Although not the exclusive type of incentive, the most 
199. Barrientos, supra note 83, at 981–82; see also Miller, supra note 8, at 41–42. 
200. Sum & Ngai, supra note 164, at 195. 
201. Geis, supra note 26, at 991 (“A third strategy for mitigating outsourcing agency risk is to set 
a compensation scheme that seeks to align vendors’ economic interests with those of the 
principal.”). 
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effective incentives may be the ones that enable suppliers to comply 
with CSR standards and reward them for doing so.202 
The incorporation of supplier incentives will likely determine the 
success of CSR initiatives adopted. For example, in the wake of the 
tragedy at Rana Plaza, two different CSR initiatives were adopted: the 
Bangladesh Accords and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety. 
The Accords were created by apparel companies, NGOs, and labor 
unions in order to improve fire and building safety in the Bangladeshi 
garment industry. What is distinctive about the Accords is the role of the 
apparel company in achieving the Accords’ objectives. Specifically, the 
Accords contains a section entitled “Supplier Incentives” that contains 
both sticks and carrots that apparel companies should use in order to 
cajole their suppliers into compliance.203 
For example, the Accords require that apparel companies finance the 
cost of improved standards in their production sites, although they are 
given latitude in designing the precise form of financing.204 This is an 
important step because it reduces the temptation for suppliers to cheat if 
the apparel companies are “ensur[ing] that it is financially feasible for 
the factories to maintain safe workplaces”205 and helping to finance the 
upgrading and remediation process. Additionally, under Article 24, 
signatory firms also financially contribute to the Accords’ programs.206 
However, under the Accords, apparel companies do not only share costs 
with their suppliers. Governance of this program is shared between 
representatives of the signatory firms and signatory unions, and 
capacity-building is also a shared responsibility. The Accords also 
include important changes in sourcing practices. Signatory companies 
commit to source at least sixty-five percent of their production volume 
202. Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 18 (reporting that Hewlett Packard “allowed [suppliers] 
slightly more profits and other allowances if they were used to improve worker conditions”); see 
also Yu, supra note 192, at 526. 
203. ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH 6 (May 13, 2013), 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf [hereinafter BANGLADESH 
ACCORD]. 
204. Id. (“In order to induce Tier 1 and Tier 2 factories to comply with upgrade and remediation 
requirements of the program, participating brands and retailers will negotiate commercial terms 
with their suppliers which ensure that it is financially feasible for the factories to maintain safe 
workplaces and comply with upgrade and remediation requirements instituted by the Safety 
Inspector. Each signatory company may, at its option, use alternative means to ensure factories have 
the financial capacity to comply with remediation requirements, including but not limited to joint 
investments, providing loans, accessing donor or government support, through offering business 
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from Tier 1 or Tier 2 firms, which are firms characterized by significant 
orders and long-term supply relationships.207 Finally, Article 23 helps to 
prevent flight by retailers in response to improved standards and 
increased costs.208 
However, many firms—mostly American—have opted for another 
route for addressing the tragedy at Rana Plaza. The Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety began with a group of North American 
brands and retailers who also wanted to improve conditions in the 
garment industry in Bangladesh. Initially, the Alliance’s approach 
appears very similar to the approach taken under the Accords. Although 
the Alliance’s plan includes some commitments to improving training 
and provision of funding, it appears to replicate more of the same by 
relying on auditing and verification. Unlike the Accords, the Alliance 
approach does not provide the same opportunities for worker 
representation and it is not binding.209  Additionally, under the Accords, 
brand firms will guarantee the availability of funds for upgrading unsafe 
factories.210 By contrast, even if loans are made available under the 
Alliance, “there is no obligation to create commercial terms that would 
allow factory owners to repay.”211 The key differences between the two 
approaches, therefore, concern the types of incentives that each offers 
the Bangladeshi suppliers to change their practices and improve safety 
conditions. The Accords partner suppliers and buyers regarding 
governance, capacity-building, financing, and sourcing behavior and 
therefore necessitate changes in behavior at both ends of the global value 
chain. 
The Alliance appears to favor a top-down approach applied by the 
buyers that does not seem to resolve tension points in the global value 
chain that led to crises like Rana Plaza. In other words, it has not offered 
key incentives to suppliers in order to get them to cooperate. 
III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: DIMENSIONS OF 
DECENTRALIZATION 
The fragmented firm poses two important challenges for public actors 
207. Id. at 1–2 (Articles 1–3). 
208. Id. at 6. 
209. Walmart/Gap Bangladesh Safety Plan: Pale Imitation of Accord, INDUS. GLOBAL UNION 
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and other stakeholders who are concerned about labor standards in 
globalized value chains. The first challenge involves identifying the 
relevant actors and designing incentives that are effective for securing 
their compliance with the desired labor standards. As explained in 
Section I, many of the drawbacks to the current CSR initiatives is that 
these approaches are based on the view that the buying end of the value 
chain contains the only key actors.212 That is why many of the incentives 
are targeted towards actors who have the profile of a large, multinational 
retailer or brand name. The neglect of other actors in the value chain, 
therefore, reinforces a belief in the unitary nature of the firm without 
acknowledging its fragmented, dispersed, and conflicted characteristics. 
In order to be effective, public actors must resist the urge to offer 
incentives to only one type of actor in the value chain (unitary model of 
firm) and instead design incentives for the diverse range of actors 
actually operating in the value chain (fragmented model of firm). As 
explained above, the most effective incentives for suppliers are those 
that alleviate asymmetries in rent and risk.213 
The second challenge relates to how incentives are transmitted in the 
value chain. One reason that California targeted its legislation to 
multinational buyers is because it is easier for California to regulate 
directly those actors found in its jurisdiction. It is far more difficult for it 
to reach actors located across borders due to limitations relating to 
jurisdiction, information, legitimacy, and capacity. Therefore, it is 
important that California and other stakeholders organize their activities 
into a form of governance that will allow them to transmit incentives to 
key actors in the value chain, even if they are located far away. This 
would allow stakeholders to aggregate their leverage by expanding the 
toolkit of incentives that they can offer collectively. This objective 
requires that California, Denmark, and other public actors substitute the 
traditional state-dominated forms of regulation (command and control) 
for a decentralized approach that involves a diversity of stakeholders 
(reflexive law). Figure 1 below provides an illustration of these two 
dimensions. 
212. See supra notes 118–84 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 201–11 and accompanying text. 
 
                                                     
08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:56 PM 
786 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:747 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Decentralization 
 
The Section below describes the importance of decentralization along 
both of these dimensions. Lack of decentralization along the incentive 
dimension results in a situation where the incentives produced are 
appropriate for only one segment of the value chain. Part A below 
outlines a number of these incentives that are more appropriate for 
securing supplier cooperation. 
However, designing supplier incentives will be ineffective if these 
incentives are still transmitted under a traditional approach to regulation: 
command and control. Decentralized incentives require a decentralized 
approach to governance as well. This requires a form of regulation that 
involves a variety of stakeholders instead of the lead of one actor, such 
as the state. Section B explores the limitation of command and control 
regulation to transmit “decentralized” incentives. It also explains the 
limitation of current approaches to multi-stakeholder coordination that 
relies on networks. It concludes by advocating for governance using a 
reflexive law approach to coordination. 
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A. Incentives Dimension: Designing Incentives for the Fragmented 
Firm 
Current approaches to improving CSR are limited by the failure of 
those approaches to offer the types of incentives that can win supplier 
cooperation. This is because these efforts do not adequately distinguish 
between the interests of upstream and downstream firms in the value 
chain. These approaches assume a harmony of interests between the two 
ends of the value chain and neglect points of tension. It is this tension, 
however, that leads to resistance from the lower-tiers of the value chain 
to CSR initiatives. Such resistance can take several forms, including 
supplier manipulation of the auditing process, reliance on contract labor, 
and continued violations in overseas facilities. These result in the 
limitations to current CSR initiatives that rely on disclosures and 
monitoring. 
In order to effectively reform the global value chain, public actors 
must stop assuming that the only relevant interests are those of a 
downstream firm. Such assumptions produce CSR initiatives that 
primarily address the interests and cost-benefit calculations of a 
downstream buyer but have limited relevance for upstream suppliers.214 
Reputational damage, for example, is a powerful driver for brand name 
buyers but not for unknown suppliers who do not sell directly to a broad 
consumer base. This distinction is important because, as influential as 
downstream firms may be in the global value chain, they are unable or 
unwilling to secure compliance without the “buy-in” of suppliers.215 
Reform of the global value chain therefore requires acknowledging the 
full spectrum of interests involved and designing incentives that speak to 
the various segments of the value chain. 
1. Sanctioning Audit Manipulation 
Overseas factory managers and other local actors are in the best 
position to determine the accuracy of the monitoring of labor practices. 
Unfortunately, they currently have a strong incentive to provide positive, 
but inaccurate, representations in order to retain an American firm’s 
business without having to actually alter their operations.216 One 
approach to discouraging this form of supplier behavior, therefore, is to 
increase the cost of these activities. The nature of the costs involved may 
214. See supra notes 118–84 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra notes 146–84 and accompanying text. 
216. See Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 163, at 2–3. 
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vary but the idea is to increase costs so that suppliers shift resources 
from hiding to compliance.217 Public actors can also encourage firms to 
increase both the quantity and quality of their monitoring activities. 
Mandatory social reporting does not accomplish much if the information 
gathered is inaccurate. Notified of the risks of audit evasion, public 
actors should now ensure that firms guard themselves against these risks 
in their monitoring activities. 
The problem with imposing costs on upstream suppliers is that 
although it may discourage audit manipulation, it will not improve 
conditions. In other words, reducing audit manipulation is an 
intermediate goal but is not the ultimate objective for those who want to 
improve conditions in global value chains. Removing audit manipulation 
will not accomplish the ultimate objective of reducing the risk of labor 
violations. The reason relates to the asymmetry of risk and rent that was 
discussed in Section II.B.218 Current global value chains are generally 
skewed in favor of downstream buyers, who extract a disproportionately 
greater share of the benefits of the value chain while offloading a 
disproportionately large share of the risk to the upstream suppliers.219 
A study commissioned by the World Bank found that many suppliers 
distrust the motivations of buyers because of this tension between 
corporate codes of conduct they promote and the substantial pressure 
that suppliers experience to lower prices and increase turnaround 
times.220 The study found that many supplier complaints “stem from an 
overall sense of powerlessness that is underpinned by a perception that 
suppliers are asked to shoulder the costs of compliance, whereas buyers 
receive the benefits.”221 This tension between the twin goals presented 
by buyers leads to mistrust by suppliers and decreases their likelihood 
for cooperation. Increased auditing may even compound this mistrust 
217. Id. at 21. 
218. See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra notes 197–209 and accompanying text. 
220. HELLE BANK JØRGENSON ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, STRENGTHENING IMPLEMENTATION 
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS (2003), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/12/19/ 
000090341_20051219093957/Rendered/PDF/346640Strengthening1Implementation.pdf 
[hereinafter Strengthening Implementation]. 
221. Id. at 25; Barrientos & Smith, supra note 16, at 725–26; Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, supra 
note 31, at 204; Chan & Siu, supra note 149 (“In the latter half of the 1990s, as Wal-Mart sourced 
more and more from China, doubling its imports between 1997 and 2002 . . . it became one of the 
engines that drove down prices, and in turn migrant wages in the export sector. The price pressure 
on other MNCs was so great that, by quickly following suit, they plunged Chinese suppliers into an 
intense competition among themselves to acquire orders by squeezing as much out of Chinese 
workers as they possibly could.” (citations omitted)). 
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because it sends external signals to suppliers regarding the buyer’s lack 
of trust in them.222 
The slim profit margins of upstream suppliers and the high 
competition among them means that there are not enough resources at 
the upstream end of the supply chain to implement the types of changes 
that Western consumers and their governments demand. Improving 
conditions requires money and the cost of this implementation is often 
imposed on upstream suppliers (except for the cost of the auditing 
process). Given slim profit margins, upstream suppliers opt to provide 
the appearance of compliance rather than invest in actual compliance 
because many claim that they cannot afford to do otherwise. 
Sanctioning, therefore, will have limited effect. It may improve 
transparency and the effectiveness of monitoring; however, removing 
audit manipulation may reveal only grim results from genuine audits as 
suppliers cannot afford to conform to the codes imposed by 
multinational buyers. In such a situation, a supplier will repeatedly fail 
the audits and likely be subject to termination. Termination is a 
problematic outcome because it negatively affects the welfare of the 
workers and, as a result, may incentivize them to hide the true conditions 
at the overseas sites.223 
If change is to occur, therefore, the costs of compliance cannot be 
relegated to the upstream end of the supply network. Instead, they must 
be transmitted downstream. Imposing costs on audit manipulation will 
depend on the relative skill and expertise of the monitor compared to the 
supplier. Suppliers—situated in the territory and social, political, and 
cultural context of the facility and workers—may be better at hiding 
their infractions than external monitors are at discovering these 
infractions. Additionally, auditing is still an infrequent phenomenon. 
Even if a facility is audited several times annually, who is watching on 
all of the other days of the year? The increased quality demands on 
auditing due to audit manipulation may increase the costs of auditing 
and result in even less frequent audits. Therefore, a better way to 
incentivize suppliers to improve the global value chain is by taking away 
their incentive to cheat by giving them a feasible path to compliance. 
Such a path is not offered under the current approach of auditing 
suppliers and threatening sanctions for infractions; instead, it depends on 
offering suppliers benefits for cooperation. 
222. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1809 (2000). 
223. See Sum & Ngai, supra note 164, at 198. 
 
                                                     
08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:56 PM 
790 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:747 
2. Rewarding Compliance 
Suppliers claim that there is a strong tension between the stated goals 
of buyers regarding improvement and their sourcing practices in favor of 
ever decreasing prices, shorter lead times, and temporary contracts. For 
example, local factory owners in Bangladesh report that they resort to 
unauthorized subcontracting by smaller, uninspected factories in order to 
meet the rapid turnaround of large volume orders by large retailers, such 
as Walmart.224 Unauthorized subcontracting appears to be a prevalent 
practice in Bangladesh and is a “primary reason safety guidelines that 
apply to bigger contractors have not prevented the hundreds of worker 
deaths in fires and building collapses in facilities like Rana Plaza.”225 
In order for suppliers to implement better practices, suppliers need to 
overcome these asymmetries by transmitting the cost of compliance 
downstream to the multinational buyer. Given the considerable costs and 
issues associated with auditing, a more reliable path forward is to 
incentivize cooperation from upstream suppliers so that they adhere to 
better practices even without the looming threat of monitoring and 
possible termination. Currently, the bulk of the financial burden for 
implementation costs falls upon upstream suppliers.226 This results in a 
strong incentive for suppliers to cheat because “[i]f the buyers do not 
reward the socially responsible suppliers by purchasing products with 
prices reflecting the increase in production costs, the suppliers, in order 
to survive, will likely create the appearance of social responsibility 
without actually making any improvements.”227 Analysts of CSR 
practices in China have claimed that Chinese suppliers face a strong 
incentive to cheat and misrepresent factory conditions because of tension 
between improving working conditions (requiring raising costs) and 
maintaining low prices in order to remain competitive and retain 
contracts with firms from the developed countries.228 
In order to encourage upstream suppliers to actually implement good 
practices—and not simply hide their violations—these suppliers should 
be relieved of bearing the costs of compliance alone. Instead, they 
224. See Bajaj, supra note 198. 
225. Id. 
226. Gould, supra note 151, at 25; Lund-Thomsen, supra note 159, at 1014. 
227. Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain: 
Resistance, Reconsideration, and Resolution in China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 321, 335–
36 (2007). 
228. Id. at 335; Roberts et al., supra note 167 (“But factory managers in China complain in 
interviews that U.S. price pressure creates a powerful incentive to cheat on labor standards that 
American companies promote as a badge of responsible capitalism.”). 
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should be allowed to transmit the costs of compliance downstream and 
without fear that increasing the cost of their prices will terminate their 
business with their customers in the developed countries. The challenge, 
of course, is to identify who will absorb the increased costs of 
compliance. Improved working conditions come at a price and the 
tension along the value chain arises from the dispute over who will pay 
for these improvements. 
B. Governance Dimension: Transmitting Incentives in a Global Value 
Chain 
Designing incentives that are “decentralized” and appropriate for 
buyers as well as suppliers is only part of the solution. Public actors also 
need an effective system for transmitting those incentives to suppliers. 
This is a challenge in this age of the fragmented firm that spans multiple 
continents. Transmitting incentives to suppliers therefore depends on the 
governance used; governance choices determine whether incentives 
designed for suppliers can reach suppliers. There are three main 
governance options that are discussed here: command and control, 
network coordination, and reflexive coordination. As discussed in 
Section III.B.1 below, command and control regulation is inadequate to 
transmit incentives because of constraints experienced by public actors 
at either ends of the value chain: home states and host states. Network 
coordination has been advocated as a way to counteract the constraints 
of state actors by involving non-traditional actors, such as sub-state 
actors and even other stakeholders. However, as explained in Section 
III.B.2 below, this form of governance is also not up to the task of 
transmitting incentives in the value chain because of the conflicts of 
interests between the potential network participants. By contrast, 
reflexive law offers a novel approach to governance that allows public 
actors and other stakeholders to maximize the incentives that they can 
offer suppliers but without the difficulties of bargaining and negotiating 
with each other. Section III.B.3 explains the decentralized turn in 
governance, illustrated by reflexive law, and proposes a novel 
application of reflexive law as an approach to multi-stakeholder 
coordination. 
1. The Limits of Command and Control Regulation 
Denmark and California may soon be joined by other governments of 
multinational buyers that attempt to improve monitoring and disclosure 
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requirements, thereby hoping to exert an upward pressure on compliance 
standards in global value chains.229 The limitation of this strategy is that 
the weaknesses in the value chain occur beyond the legislative reach of 
these states. Requiring greater due diligence and disclosure from 
multinational buying firms is a positive development, but the benefits 
are limited by the types of upstream responses discussed in Section II.A. 
These abuses occur in factories and facilities overseas so that the willing 
sovereign is unable to regulate directly the offensive practices or 
practitioners. For example, following the collapse at Rana Plaza, the 
U.S. and the European Union pressured Bangladesh to change its labor 
laws and safety regulations.230 However, the response by Bangladesh 
was to look for alternative markets for their garment exports in order to 
reduce their dependence on U.S. and European Union markets.231 
Host States often suffer from weak or non-existent regulatory 
capacity that prevents them from enforcing standards and ensuring 
compliance.232 Private regulation through corporate codes of conduct 
and monitoring may actually be the only way that labor and 
environmental conditions are addressed in some developing countries.233 
China has environmental and labor laws in place, but only attaches 
moderate fines to violations because of corruption, lack of resources, and 
importance of economic objectives.234 
This weak regulatory capacity can also result in an inability to 
perform audits on the local supplier’s facilities.235 Bolstering 
environmental and labor standards may not be viewed as a priority by 
host state regulators who may fear that such regulations may 
compromise the achievement of economic objectives.236 For example, 
the Bangladeshi government is encountering significant opposition from 
229. Hess, supra note 7, at 450. 
230. Amrutha Gayathri, Bangladesh’s Garment Exports Surge in July; U.S., Canadian Retailers 




232. See Framework, supra note 2, at 5; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 538–39 (lack of 
capacity and willingness to regulate); Natasha A. Affolder, The Private Life of Environmental 
Treaties, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 513–14 (2009); Brittany T. Cragg, Home Is Where the Halt Is: 
Mandating Corporate Social Responsibility Through Home State Regulation and Social Disclosure, 
24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 735, 752 (2010). 
233. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 523. 
234. Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 164, at 19. 
235. Locke et al., supra note 76, at 541. 
236. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 538. 
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factory owners regarding raising the wage level beyond a certain 
point.237 Host state government officials’ willingness to censure 
suppliers is further reduced when those same government officials are 
personally connected with the supplier and its operations in the host 
state. Many suppliers are supported by government investment, leading 
one analyst to remark that “Wal-mart in China is therefore a virtual 
‘joint venture’ between the company and the Chinese government.”238 
Host states (and their sub-units) also encounter significant difficulties 
in controlling the behavior of upstream suppliers—like contract 
manufacturers—operating within their territories because of national and 
sub-national competition for the business of these suppliers. In pursuit of 
economic growth, local governments, for example, will compromise the 
enforcement of labor and environmental laws in order to compete for the 
business of suppliers.239 Local governments vying for Foxconn’s 
business offer a full spectrum of resources at their disposal, including 
labor. Some township and village governments have provided Foxconn 
with free labor recruitment services, while others have imposed a 
recruitment quota on their officials.240 Foxconn is also able to secure 
waivers of rent and taxes and to secure these facilities at prices below 
market rate.241 Given this level of solicitation, it is doubtful whether 
these same local government officials are willing or able to monitor 
compliance with laws and standards that they sacrifice for the sake of a 
business relationship with suppliers like Foxconn. As a result of this 
dynamic, suppliers exercise a great deal of influence over host state 
regulators and policymakers and can impede efforts to change their 
practices. 
2. The Limits of Network Coordination 
Regulatory networks have dominated contemporary imagination on 
how to coordinate activities of actors dispersed across the globe. These 
networks are “informal multilateral forums that bring together 
representatives from national regulatory agencies or departments to 
facilitate multilateral cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the 
237. Arun Devnath, Bangladesh Raises Minimum Wage for Garment Workers After Unrest, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/print/2013-11-13/ 
bangladesh-garment-factories-to-stay-shut-amid-worker-protests.html; Gayathri, supra note 230 
(noting that wage rates did ultimately improve following the collapse at Rana Plaza). 
238. Appelbaum & Lichtenstein, supra note 102, at 109. 
239. Ngai & Chan, supra note 98, at 392. 
240. Id. at 390–91. 
241. Id. at 391. 
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authority of participants.”242 Cooperation through networks provides its 
members greater access to information sharing across borders, thereby 
improving enforcement efforts.243 Networks also serve as a forum for 
promoting uniformity of standards in order to discourage regulatory 
competition between actors.244 Networks have tackled issues relating to 
securities regulation, banking supervision, and insurance.245 
A network approach to enforcement of labor standards in value chains 
could offer a productive environment for information sharing, 
brainstorming, bargaining, and delegating functions among different 
actors. If network regulation of value chains operated similarly to 
network coordination of securities regulations and banking supervision, 
we would expect to see frequent meetings between governmental 
officials of the different states implicated in value chains, such as home 
states of multinational buyers and host states of production. Such 
meetings could involve agency representatives from departments of 
trade or labor who come together to harmonize standards, share 
information, and improve enforcement efforts. Network meetings 
between sub-state legislators could also provide a fruitful setting for 
progress. As discussed in previous sections, the sites of regulatory 
competition are increasingly local or regional.246 Chinese municipalities 
compete against each other to woo business to their territory.247 For 
these reasons, the relevant host state legislator is more likely found at the 
regional or local level. 
Similarly, one of the most robust approaches to regulation of 
multinational buyers has also originated from a sub-state legislator: 
California. As in the case of host state regulators, sub-state legislators 
located in the home state may be a more significant group than national 
legislators because legislative movement may be more likely at the sub-
national level as opposed to the national arena.248 Therefore, network 
242. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 113, 118 (2009). 
243. See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 4, at 290. 
244. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 29. 
245. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 4, at 287–301 (discussing the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, International Organization of Securities Commissions, and International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors). 
246. See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text; Lin, supra note 227, at 362–63. 
248. The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act (H.R. 2759) was introduced by 
Representative Carolyn Maloney to the 112th Congress on August 1, 2011 and was meant to 
achieve the following objective: “To require companies to include in their annual reports to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission a disclosure describing any measures the company has taken 
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meetings between sub-state legislators from home states and host states 
might serve as productive settings for convergence on labor standards 
and cooperation on enforcement. Labor abuses in value chains are 
facilitated by regulatory competition among jurisdictions. This 
competition encourages downward pressure on labor standards, 
especially by host state regulators desperate to court international 
business.249 Sub-state actors are therefore reluctant to introduce or 
enforce adequate labor standards due to a fear that such action might 
precipitate business flight from its borders in favor of the country—or 
municipality—“next door” that might offer more lax standards.250 
Harmonization of labor standards, therefore, and cooperation and 
commitments regarding enforcement might offer a way to limit this race-
to-the-bottom situation. The enforcement of comparable labor laws 
globally could discourage forum-shopping by multinational buyers and 
relieve host states from having to sacrifice labor standards. 
However, such a network is compromised by several factors. First, 
many networks operate based on voluntary compliance by their 
members because of the difficulties with monitoring and enforcement.251 
Harmonization of standards within a network is a product of such 
consensus and is unlikely to occur between host state and home state 
regulators. This is because labor regulation can serve as a form of 
competitive advantage for economies, especially in the developing 
world. By harmonizing their labor standards with those found in 
developed economies, host states in the developing world reduce or lose 
this perceived competitive advantage. They will therefore be resistant to 
harmonizing their labor standards with competitors.252 
Of course, networks are also sites of power dynamics. One member’s 
during the year to identify and address conditions of forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and 
the worst forms of child labor within the company’s supply chains.” Business Transparency on 
Trafficking and Slavery Act, H.R. 2759, 112th Cong. (2011). Congress failed to enact H.R. 2759. 
H.R. 2759 (112th), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2759 (last visited 
June 4, 2013). 
249. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and 
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 51–52 (1993) (discussing horizontal regulatory competition 
and the risk of “race for the bottom” scenarios). 
250. Id. at 58. 
251. Verdier, supra note 242, at 118, 130, 163; see also Brummer, supra note 4, at 290–91. 
252. See Brummer, supra note 4, at 269–70 (discussing differences in regulatory preferences 
because of adjustment costs); David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labor 
Practices Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 360–61 
(2005) (discussing the risk of race to the bottom regulations); Verdier, supra note 242, at 124, 129 
(discussing the distributive problems of harmonizing standards). 
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reluctance can be overcome by another member’s influence.253 Networks 
can be so susceptible to soft power that U.S. participants in transnational 
regulatory networks have viewed these networks as conduits for the 
export of U.S.-styled regulation to other jurisdictions.254 However, this 
may be less true at the sub-national setting where sub-state legislators 
have a more limited set of sticks and carrots to offer uncooperative 
members.255 Analysts have also observed that the independence and 
efficacy of regulatory networks arise from the nature of issues that are 
addressed within network settings. Specifically, networks tend to 
confront technical rather than political issues.256 However, labor 
standards, which impact economic performance and job prospects for 
workers in host and home states, are unlikely to be perceived as a purely 
technical matter. Instead, it will be viewed as a significant political issue 
that—at least in the United States—must be subjected to democratic 
checks. Setting labor standards within networks may also be politically 
unpopular because networks are not transparent; instead, networks are 
exclusive arrangements that are often secretive.257 The combination of 
exclusivity and secrecy limit access to these networks to a narrow class 
of actors and limit participation by other stakeholders.258 These reasons 
help explain why networks also usually address economic or 
environmental issues rather than social issues.259 
In addition to these constraints, any regulations produced within 
networks of sub-state actors would be limited because of a noticeable 
absence from the negotiating table: multinational companies. Effective 
reform of the value chain cannot be based solely on public actor action 
because these actors’ consolidated leverage does not include the types of 
incentives that a multinational buyer could offer suppliers. Importantly, 
the latter’s set of incentives may be a necessary condition for securing 
supplier compliance. 
Of course, one solution could simply be to expand the table to include 
representatives from the private sector and even other stakeholders. 
253. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 27. 
254. See id. at 32. 
255. See Verdier, supra note 242, at 128. 
256. See Raustiala, supra note 5, at 24 (“[P]olitical deference to agency actions in international 
affairs appears justified by a sense that the issues are narrowly technical—and thus appropriately 
controlled by a domestic agency—rather than broadly political, and thus best guided by the foreign 
affairs bureaucracy.”). 
257. See Zaring, supra note 4, at 303. 
258. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 25. 
259. Id. 
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However, transnational regulatory networks are overwhelmingly 
composed of sub-state actors, such as representatives from different state 
agencies.260 This may be due to the fact that counterparts are better able 
to understand common issues and interests and therefore better able to 
reach consensus. Introducing greater heterogeneity among actors may 
impede consensus within networks. Networks are voluntary 
arrangements. Multinational buyers may not be willing to participate 
within networks. Even if they do so, they might pose a “hold-out” 
problem unless they receive satisfactory concessions. As a result, any 
resulting regulation may be diluted and ineffective. 
The U.N. Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework can be 
understood as such an attempt to expand coordination among a greater 
spectrum of actors.261 As such, it offers an illustration of the strengths 
and weaknesses of pursuing CSR goals through a network model. The 
U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, John 
Ruggie, developed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. The Guiding Principles identify the different responsibilities of 
states and corporations regarding human rights.262 Although these 
Principles were developed by the U.N. Special Representative, he did so 
only after extensive consultations with a broad range of stakeholders.263 
The distributive problems of network coordination compromise even 
the least controversial principle of the U.N. Special Representative’s 
approach that addresses the duty of states to protect human rights. 
Convergence of state practice on this point is unlikely because many 
states—usually those found in the developing world—will face higher 
adjustment costs with conforming to more stringent standards. Their fear 
that more stringent standards will compromise their global 
competitiveness will compromise their cooperation and encourage 
similar reluctance by developed economies that do not want their 
economies to suffer from asymmetrical enforcement.264 
One of the characteristics of the U.N. Special Representative’s 
approach was its transparency and the multiple opportunities that a range 
260. Zaring, supra note 4, at 301. 
261. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text. 
262. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (Jun. 16, 2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
263. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, ch. 1, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (Jul. 6, 
2011). 
264. Surya Deva, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implications for 
Companies, 9 EUR. COMPANY L. 101, 103 (2012). 
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of actors had to contribute to the Special Representative’s work.265 The 
Principles seemed to enjoy the support of many businesses and industry 
groups.266 This support, however, may have come at a high price. Critics 
of the Principles take issue with the aspirational language used, which 
they claim should have been replaced with more specific directions to 
states and businesses.267 Others criticize the Principles for failing to 
provide monitoring mechanisms or attach any legal accountability to 
businesses.268 It is therefore unlikely that business practices will 
significantly improve. 
3. Toward Reflexive Coordination 
The effectiveness of command and control or network coordination is 
limited because these rely solely on state actors and state based leverage 
is insufficient to offer the types of incentives needed for both buyers and 
suppliers in value chains. 
The limits of state power—either in its command or networked form 
—necessitate the need for an alternative approach to regulation that 
harnesses the leverage possessed by non-state actors. After all, actors 
obey the law for a variety of reasons that may have little to do with the 
coercive power of the state. Other institutions and actors reinforce the 
proscriptions of the law and the commands of state authority. What is 
needed is a form of regulation that explicitly and intentionally 
aggregates these non-state forms of leverage in order to achieve the 
state’s policy objectives. 
Reflexive regulation may be the answer to the recognized limits of 
state power. Humility is the origin of reflexive law: Reflexive law is 
based on acceptance of the limits of the state alone to achieve all socially 
desirable goals.269 Under reflexive law, the state no longer monopolizes, 
or even dominates, regulatory activity. Instead, public actors adopting a 
265. Jenna Martin Amerson, “The End of the Beginning?”: A Comprehensive Look at the U.N.’s 
Business and Human Rights Agenda from a Bystander Perspective, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
871, 914–15 (2012). 
266. Id. at 915. 
267. See, e.g., Joint Civil Society Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS. (Jan. 2011), http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ 
Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf. 
268. See Amerson, supra note 265, at 916–17. 
269. Doorey, supra note 252, at 370 (“Reflexive law recognizes law’s limitations as a tool for 
controlling complex social behaviour. It focuses on the norm-producing potential of intermediate 
institutions between the state and markets and private actors and seeks ways to mobilize, to 
influence, to steer, to ‘irritate’ those institutions so that they create desirable norms and practices.”); 
Orts, supra note 6, at 1265. 
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reflexive approach recognize the varied and considerable pressure points 
offered by other actors—consumers, shareholders, media, labor groups, 
NGOs—that can encourage the targeted industry to make “voluntary 
adjustments in their behaviour that are consistent with the goals of the 
state.”270 Reflexive regulation allows these other actors to participate 
with state actors in exercising leverage over the targeted industry.271 
This inclusiveness is the first characteristic of reflexive law that 
distinguishes it from command and control regulation. 
The second important characteristic relates to how state power is 
exercised under reflexive law.272 The fact that a non-state actor has the 
potential to wield leverage over the targeted industry does not mean that 
it possesses the means to do so effectively. A number of constraints may 
prevent a non-state actor from exercising the leverage that it possesses. 
One such example of a constraint is information. Asymmetrical 
information between consumers and brand firms, for example, prevents 
consumers from learning of firm behavior and sanctioning conduct “with 
their wallet.” 
The role of the state is to convert the potential of non-state leverage 
into realized power by removing the constraints that prevent the 
effective exercise of that leverage. If non-state actors are prevented from 
exercising their leverage because of a lack of information regarding 
industry practices, the public actor steps into this void by mandating 
disclosures regarding firm practices or establishing a forum for dialogue 
on best practices. The public actor facilitates the exercise of leverage by 
consumers by improving the flow of information between industry and 
consumers. 
For example, in the environmental context, environmental labeling is 
a reflexive strategy because it creates access to information for the 
consumer who can discriminate between products based on the 
“environmental friendliness” of the product.273 The leverage exercised 
here is that of the consumer; it is the consumer who brings the pressure 
to bear on firms and encourages the latter to make more 
environmentally-sound products. The public actor’s only role is to 
facilitate the consumer’s ability to exercise her leverage. The public 
actors do this by creating a flow of information between private industry 
and the consumer so that the latter learns about the environmental 
270. Doorey, supra note 252, at 371; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 525. 
271. See Doorey, supra note 252, at 366; Hess, supra note 7, at 458. 
272. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 520–21; Doorey, supra note 252, at 366 (2005); Hess, 
supra note 7, at 458. 
273. Orts, supra note 6, at 1271–72. 
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policies of the different firms and can support or boycott their products 
accordingly. 
The public actor’s role has therefore changed from direct intervention 
and source of sanctions (command and control) to facilitate the ability of 
these other actors to consolidate their pressure over the targeted industry 
(reflexive law).274 A public actor fulfills this facilitative role by 
establishing processes that guide actors toward socially desirable 
behavior: “In becoming reflexive the form of legal regulation changes 
from substantive to procedural law.”275 
Reflexive law’s insight has already been applied to the field of 
corporate social responsibility by Danish and California requirements for 
social reporting by businesses. Social reporting is a form of reflexive law 
because “a social report would not mandate that certain predetermined 
outcomes be reached, but would instead require a corporation to reflect 
on how its practices impact society and to open up dialogues with the 
relevant stakeholders.”276 Like environmental labeling, the leverage 
comes from the public, especially consumers. This non-state form of 
leverage is particularly significant for value chains involving brand firms 
because of their visibility and consequent sensitivity to consumer 
preferences. It is the threat of consumer purchasing choices that 
encourages brand firms to improve their practices.277 But consumers 
need information in order to wield the wallet effectively. The problem is 
that consumers have limited power to obtain that information from 
firms.278 That is where the public actor enters. It is within the public 
actor’s power to demand that firms make such information available to 
the public. This sets the wheels in motion for consumers and other 
stakeholders to respond to that information.279 
This coordination between public and non-public actors demonstrates 
274. Doorey, supra note 252, at 366; Hess, supra note 7, at 458. 
275. Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, Reflexive Labour Law: An Introduction, in REFLEXIVE 
LABOUR LAW 1, 7 (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, eds., 1994); see also Hess, supra note 6, at 
42–43; Orts, supra note 6, at 1264 (“Reflexive solutions offload some of the weight of social 
regulation from the legal system to other social actors. This is accomplished by proceduralization. 
Rather than detailed pronouncements of acceptable behavior, the law adopts procedures for 
regulated entities to follow. The procedures are adopted with a design in mind to encourage thinking 
and behavior in the right direction.” (emphasis in original)). 
276. Hess, supra note 6, at 46. 
277. See Narine, supra note 148, at 360 (explaining that the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals 
reporting provision “depends on consumers and investors to pressure the firms . . . to change their 
business practices”). 
278. Hess, supra note 7, at 457. 
279. Id.; Miller, supra note 8, at 44. 
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the capitalization of two forms of leverage over the target firm: the 
leverage to command disclosure of information (needed by the consumer 
but within the power of the public actor to obtain) and the leverage to 
pressure firms to improve practices (desired by the public actor but 
within the power of the consumer to demand). These reinforcing 
capabilities demonstrate that the strength of reflexive law is that it 
incorporates the participation of a variety of intermediaries—such as 
media, consumers, and NGOs—into efforts to improve corporate 
behavior. Each of these stakeholders has something unique to offer to 
recalcitrant actors in the value chain. A reflexive law approach 
aggregates the leverage that these combined actors can wield. 
Despite these strengths, mandating social reporting—even as 
reflexive law—will still fail to achieve the outcomes that its proponents 
desire. This is because mandatory social reporting systems—like the 
ones in place in Denmark and California—are insufficiently sensitive to 
the variety of interests in the global value chain. Its incentives are 
tailored to the buying end of the value chain to the neglect of the 
suppliers. Disclosures are still dependent upon audits with all the 
attendant issues previously discussed.280 As such, social reporting may 
demonstrate a decentralization of governance, but not decentralization of 
incentives. 
Stakeholders must commit to decentralization in both the form of 
governance (reflexive law) and regulations (incentives). This second 
dimension of decentralization is what is missing from mandatory social 
reporting strategies to combat abuses in the value chain. Reflexive law is 
only one half of the solution. Its advantage is its ability to aggregate 
leverage from a variety of actors and, as such, it offers a superior form of 
governance of transnational CSR norms compared to traditional 
command and control regulation. Its limited success in the mandatory 
social reporting arena is due to the fact that it has been misapplied. 
Reflexive law is a conduit for transmitting incentives; it has failed so far 
with CSR because it has been transmitting the wrong types of incentives. 
Under social reporting, it has been transmitting incentives to 
multinational buyers while neglecting upstream suppliers. As such, it has 
succeeded along one dimension of decentralization, governance, but has 
failed along the other, incentives. The way to improve the use of 
reflexive law regarding CSR is to ensure that the incentives are 
addressed to suppliers as well as other actors in the value chain. 
280. See supra notes 158–85 and accompanying text (describing the social reporting requirements 
encouraged by international, national, and sub-national actors and the ways that suppliers 
undermine these efforts). 
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IV. GOVERNING AMIDST THE FRAGMENTS: A CHAIN 
SOLUTION TO A CHAIN PROBLEM 
A fragmented firm requires fragmented regulation, but what does 
such regulation look like? It first requires that public actors decentralize 
the incentives they offer so that they can target a greater variety of actors 
in the value chain. It also requires a form of governance that allows them 
to transmit these incentives effectively. Reflexive law has the potential 
to achieve both these objectives. 
This use of reflexive law results in a model for regulation that 
strongly resembles the value chains that it is meant to regulate:281 
fragmentation of regulation according to functional specialization in a 
sequence of value adding activities. After all, fragmentation was the 
approach that the regulated industries adopted when they faced 
constraints similar to those confronted by public actors who are 
attempting to regulate activities overseas. 
This type of decentralized approach offers a range of benefits. First, 
reflexive coordination allows for spatial dispersion among participating 
actors and reduces issues arising from jurisdictional and geographic 
constraints. Second, one of the advantages of a global value chain is that 
it delegates and distributes roles among several actors in a manner that 
avoids duplication of efforts, capitalizes on the functional advantages of 
the actors, and adds value through a progression of steps.282 Firms that 
abandoned vertical integration chose to focus on a narrower set of core 
competencies that better reflected their specialized skills. The lesson for 
stakeholders is to engage in a similar process of self-examination 
regarding their functional advantages in order to identify the best 
exercise of their regulatory activity. Indeed, reflexive law encourages 
this form of self-evaluation because it is intended to encourage actors to 
“contemplate the negative externalities associated with their conduct” 
and “make voluntary adjustments in their behavior that are consistent 
with the goals of the state.”283 But this lesson is not meant only for the 
regulated private parties. It is also an important lesson for public actors. 
This requires recognition of one’s own limits and the advantages of 
other intermediaries to reach distant actors. 
California’s problem is the one faced by many home state 
jurisdictions: inability to regulate suppliers directly.284 The way that 
281. See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power, supra note 4, at 288. 
282. See supra notes 44–86 and accompanying text. 
283. Doorey, supra note 252, at 371. 
284. See Barrientos, supra note 83, at 981–82. 
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California transcends this limitation is by, first, distinguishing between 
target firms and intermediary stakeholders. A target firm refers to the 
actor that California wants to ultimately reach and whose behavior it is 
attempting to influence. For example, a target firm is a factory manager 
of a Bangladesh plant. An intermediary stakeholder is an actor who can 
impact factory conditions in Bangladesh and be impacted, in turn, by 
California’s own actions. An example of such an intermediate 
stakeholder is a downstream buyer that is within the jurisdictional reach 
of California. 
California has exercised its leverage over downstream firms by 
mandating social reporting.285 However, its current failure is due to its 
relative inattention to the interests of suppliers. Changing the primary 
audience for reflexive law from buyer to supplier results in a significant 
change from how reflexive law is currently used by public actors like 
California or Denmark. Under the proper application of reflexive law, 
the corporate actor (buyer) is transformed from the target of regulation 
to one of many intermediary institutions that will influence the actual 
target—the supplier—to change their behavior. 
It is important to remember what does and does not change under this 
alternative reflexive approach. Public actors, such as California, will still 
directly regulate the same actor: multinational buying firms within their 
jurisdiction. However, the objective of the regulation has now changed. 
It is not ultimately about targeting the buyer’s behavior but incentivizing 
downstream buyers with the objective of getting those buyers—as 
intermediary stakeholders—to extend particular types of incentives to 
their upstream suppliers. This objective impacts the types of incentives 
that the public actor would offer in its legislation. This insight should 
guide how stakeholders “pull” on the stakeholders within their reach, 
such as multinational buyers, to get those actors, in turn, to nudge 
suppliers along the pathway to compliance. The following Section 
describes changes—from modest to considerable—that California and 
other public actors should consider to improve labor standards in global 
value chains. 
A. Due Diligence Requirements Regarding Counter-Manipulation 
Monitoring efforts by multinational buyers are only as good as the 
quality of their audits. The California Transparency in Supply Chains 
Act of 2010 (the “California Act” or the “Act”) increases the pressure on 
285. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012). 
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buyers to perform due diligence along their value chains.286 But this 
pressure will not result in improved conditions if the audits are simply 
manipulated. The weakness of the current Act is that it decentralized 
along only one dimension: governance. It adopts a reflexive law 
approach by not mandating what a firm must do regarding its due 
diligence of its suppliers. Instead, it only requires that the firm disclose 
the extent of its action or inaction.287 The Act relies on non-state actors, 
such as consumers and NGOs, to exercise their respective forms of 
leverage to encourage firms to change practices.288 
However, the Act is not sufficiently decentralized along the incentives 
dimension. It does not explicitly acknowledge the risks created by 
supplier audit manipulation.289 The structure of these disclosure 
standards therefore encourages the view that incentivizing the buying-
end of the global value chain is sufficient to achieve the changes that 
public actors desire. This faith placed in top-down originated auditing 
procedures perpetuates the neglect of other actors in the value chain, 
including their divergent interests, relative power in the chain, and the 
choices they confront. 
One relatively direct way to change the Act so that it applies to 
suppliers more effectively is for public regulators to require firms to 
disclose their efforts to combat audit manipulation. Although the 
legislation improves the quantity of audits occurring, it does not do 
enough to safeguard the quality of such audits.290 This is why California, 
and other actors considering similar legislation, should add a separate 
disclosure requirement mandating firms to disclose what steps they take 
to address risks specific to the auditing process, such as countering the 
various activities that suppliers engage in to skew the results. For 
example, California could amend the Act to include a sixth requirement 
that reads: “Performs quality control of its audits to ensure that its 
monitoring activities minimize risks of supplier or third-party 
manipulation of processes or results.”291 This addition transforms the 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. See supra notes 277–279 and accompanying text. 
289. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43. 
290. Requiring firms to disclose whether the audit was announced or not is a step in the right 
direction so that suppliers cannot use advance warning to hide their infractions. However, even an 
unannounced visit is vulnerable to other forms of evasion, such as maintaining double-books, using 
uninspected factories, manager-bias, etc. 
291. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(2). This section of the California Civil Code requires that 
firms “specify if the verification was not an independent, unannounced audit.” This requirement 
ensures that suppliers do not use advance warning to hide their infractions. However, even an 
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Act so that it is decentralized along both dimensions and now impacts 
the decision-making of suppliers more effectively. This may appear as a 
modest change to the current status quo but that is its advantage. This 
reform capitalizes on the law that is already in place and, as such, offers 
a solution that will be more straightforward to implement. By contrast, 
the solutions discussed in the sections below outline suggestions for 
more significant structural change and therefore may take more time and 
resources to implement. 
B. Disclosures Beyond the Audit: Changing Governance in Global 
Value Chains 
As discussed above, asymmetries in rent and risk perpetuate supplier 
suspicions that buyers are not sincere about improving conditions.292 
The tension between corporate CSR policies, on the one hand, and 
procurement practices, on the other, only compound these suspicions 
and make it difficult for suppliers to comply. These frustrations 
experienced by suppliers may be a product of the approach to 
governance undertaken in global value chains. Under market 
governance, buyers tend to use the market to manage their suppliers and, 
consequently, it is based on competition among suppliers.293 Market 
governance, therefore, perpetuates the tension between the sustainability 
practices demanded by buyers and their sourcing practices. For example, 
Nike experienced first-hand the effect of its governance structure on the 
implementation of its sustainability objectives. Despite its adoption of a 
corporate code of conduct, Nike’s use of a market-oriented approach to 
governing its global value chain compromised the effect of such a code: 
Though economically superlative, the arm’s-length 
subcontracting system doomed Nike’s first Code of Conduct. 
With the buyer threatening to sever the relationship if the 
supplier’s pricing was too high, code compliance was secondary 
to contractors. Relentless price pressure had also forced final 
assembly factories to (re)subcontract parts, materials, and 
processes to as many as seven tiers of vendors, further inhibiting 
code enforcement. The parties’ economic focus suppressed a 
more collaborative CSR partnership between buyer and supplier. 
unannounced visit is vulnerable to other forms of evasion, such as maintaining double-books, using 
uninspected factories, manager-bias, etc. 
292. See Jiang, supra note 166, at 88 (“[S]uppliers’ main objective is to pass the audit, rather than 
address the substantive issues that are the focus of the audit.”). 
293. See id. at 80. 
 
                                                     
08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:56 PM 
806 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:747 
Nike was concerned only with the fiscal bottom line and 
subcontracting factories were ready to switch to another buyer 
for a better economic deal. Due to this aloofness (‘‘my-business-
is-my-business; your-business-is-your-business’’), neither had a 
serious commitment to improving working conditions.294 
Nike saw improvement in the implementation of its code when it 
shifted from a market-oriented governance structure to a collaborative 
model with suppliers that was “characterized by a high level of 
interdependence underpinned by goodwill and trust.”295 Under this new 
approach, contractors selected into its new governance model received 
an “exclusive production relationship and guaranteed minimum monthly 
orders . . . . This contracting model provided greater certainty that Nike 
and the [selected contractors] would maintain a relationship through 
good and bad times.”296 This alternative governance structure was 
supported by information sharing on best practices between suppliers 
(previously precluded by high competition in market-based governance), 
access to Nike’s CSR experts, and shared responsibility for CSR among 
the different actors in the global value chain.297 
The lesson from the Nike case is that changing supplier incentives 
may necessitate changing how multinational buyers govern their value 
chains. Consequently, the way to offer suppliers effective incentives for 
cooperation is to change governance patterns in value chains from 
market-based approaches to alternatives that are more collaborative. 
Under this reflexive law approach, the public actor should attempt to 
alter the behavior of the target firm (the supplier) by changing the 
conditions under which the supplier operates. The specific condition that 
the public actor is attempting to change is the governance structure in the 
value chain. In order to do so, the public actor needs to focus its 
attention on the actor who is in the best position to determine the 
governance choices in a value chain: the multinational buyer. The 
objective is to get the multinational buyer, as an intermediary 
stakeholder, to change its governance practices in order to subsequently 
affect the compliance rates of its suppliers. 
A public actor confronts many difficulties in demanding that private 
industries change the way they do business and adopt a different 
management approach to their value chains. This is why it is important 
294. Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 146; see also Yu, supra note 192 (discussing Reebok’s 
procurement practices). 
295. Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 148. 
296. Id. at 149. 
297. Id. at 148. 
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for public actors that adopt a reflexive law approach to identify a second 
group of intermediary stakeholders who can exercise leverage over the 
multinational buyers to get them to change governance patterns in value 
chains. The role of the public actor, as in all reflexive approaches, is to 
facilitate the use of this leverage by this second group of intermediary 
stakeholders. 
One group of potential intermediary stakeholders is consumers. 
Mandatory social reporting can be adapted to encourage firms to change 
their governance approaches. However, consumers are not armed with 
knowledge regarding the differences and consequences of governance 
choices on the labor violations at Rana Plaza and Foxconn. Under the 
California Act, it is the behavior of the upstream end of the supply chain 
that is under scrutiny.298 What is missing from these disclosure 
requirements is attention to the behavior of downstream firms and the 
effect of their sourcing practices on the possibility of abuse by upstream 
suppliers. Suppliers for Nike and other multinational buyers do not see 
the “business case” for CSR when their buyers do not reward 
compliance and prefer to award short-term contracts to those suppliers 
who can meet their demands on low cost and short lead times: two of the 
very factors that often contribute to violations of worker’s rights.299 
This tension between stated goals and actual practices suggests a 
causal connection between downstream behavior and upstream effects 
that is thus far not reflected adequately in the dominant approaches to 
mandatory social reporting. One-sided disclosures reinforce the fear that 
the heightened requirements concerning due diligence are only 
illuminating the “effect” side of a causal connection between buyers and 
suppliers. To the extent that supplier violations are symptoms of 
sourcing practices, compliance will not change until the sourcing 
practices change. 
Consequently, disclosure requirements should be amended to include 
information on sourcing practices that have been identified as 
contributing factors to violations of corporate codes of conduct.300 These 
initiatives would resemble strategies such as Fair Trade initiatives that 
seek to inform discriminating consumers and concerned stakeholders 
about the business practices of the retailer and not just the compliance 
rate of the upstream supplier.301 
298. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012). 
299. See Bajaj, supra note 198. 
300. See Miller, supra note 8, at 41–42; Yu, supra note 192, at 523. 
301. What is Fair Trade?, FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/what-is-fair-trade (last 
visited Sep. 8, 2014). 
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One reform, therefore, is to change disclosure requirements in the 
California Act to include information on sourcing behavior by 
downstream firms. For example, downstream buyers could be required 
to disclose the following: (a) proportion of compliance costs funded by 
downstream buyer, (b) instances when improved compliance resulted in 
renewal of contract or other repeat business, and (c) average duration of 
contract with suppliers. The aim of these measures would be to improve 
transparency regarding the contributing role of downstream buyers to 
abuses in global value chains. The hope is that this improved 
transparency will lead to public pressure for reform similar to the design 
of current CSR disclosure standards. More comprehensive sustainability 
reporting is intended to change the focus of consumer attention (and 
discrimination) to evaluating the global value chain as a whole and not 
the isolated performance(s) of discrete actors in the chain. 
C. Shifting From Unilateral to Bilateral CSR Strategies 
The World Bank commissioned a study in order to understand better 
the obstacles to improving social and environmental practices by 
suppliers.302 Its study suggests that the resistance by upstream firms to 
current CSR practices can also be understood in terms of how CSR 
objectives are implemented in the value chain.303 Many CSR policies of 
downstream buyers are implemented in a unilateral, top-down, buyer-
driven manner.304 This unilateral approach to CSR suffers from the 
following limitations. First, there is a concern with standard-setting with 
suppliers faulting a unilateral approach for its exclusion of them in the 
formulation and implementation of codes.305 
Second, there is also a similar concern with capacity-building. Many 
buyers concentrate on setting standards (through corporate codes) and 
monitoring (through audits) but do not provide local managers with the 
support to implement the necessary changes.306 The weakness of audits 
is that they measure non-compliance but they generally fail to provide 
local management with the tools to make the necessary improvements.307 
As a result, managers are often overwhelmed by the areas for 
302. Strengthening Implementation, supra note 220. 
303. Id. at 23–26. 
304. See Jiang, supra note 166, at 86. 
305. Strengthening Implementation, supra note 220, at 26. 
306. Gould, supra note 151, at 25–26. 
307. Id. at 26. 
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improvement, claiming that they do not know where to begin.308 
Without the proper training and knowledge on how to improve 
conditions in fact, managers instead focus on improving the appearance 
of conditions.309 This oversight is partially due to the buyers’ mistaken 
belief that the corporate codes set standards with which a factory can 
easily comply.310 However, there are often significant gaps between 
current factory conditions and the required standards and, without 
assistance, it is unlikely that managers will improve conditions.311 
Finally, there is also frustration from suppliers regarding the allocation 
of costs associated with the implementation of improved standards.”312 It 
is no surprise, therefore, that these limitations of the unilateral approach 
lead to resistance from suppliers. 
The way to correct these incentives is to adopt an alternative model 
for corporate social responsibility that rejects a unilateral, buyer-driven, 
top-down approach in favor of a partnership model for improving CSR 
in the value chain. Such an approach caters to the interests of suppliers 
because, like the Bangladesh Accords, it focuses on increased dialogue 
between suppliers and buyers on achievable goals, collaborative action 
plans, rewards for incremental change, and measurements of continuous 
improvement rather than compliance.313 The advantages of this 
alternative approach are significant. Some suppliers believed that codes 
that are negotiated “from the bottom up” have a greater chance of 
securing a “sense of shared ownership” from suppliers.314 This could be 
a potential strategy for changing the current culture of non-compliance 
among suppliers.315 
The model for a bottom-up approach to social responsibility may 
come from a domestic supply chain that is challenging the traditional 
308. Id. 
309. Jiang, supra note 166, at 88 (“[S]uppliers’ main objective is to pass the audit, rather than 
address the substantive issues that are the focus of audit.”); see also Plambeck & Taylor, supra note 
163, at 2–3. 
310. Gould, supra note 151, at 26. 
311. Id.; Joonkoo Lee et al., Global Value Chains and Agrifood Standards: Challenges and 
Possibilities for Smallholders in Developing Countries, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,326, 
12,327 (2012). 
312. See Jiang, supra note 166, at 88; Yu, supra note 192, at 523. 
313. Gould, supra note 151, at 29. 
314. Strengthening Implementation, supra note 220, at 24–25. 
315. Id. Additionally, analysts are skeptical about the possibility of bottom-up approaches in the 
absence of long-term relationships between buyers and suppliers. Id. at 26. Hence, it may be 
necessary for disclosure of sourcing practices—and changes in those sourcing practices—to occur 
as a precondition to a bottom-up approach to CSR. 
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top-down, audit based approach to corporate social responsibility. The 
Coalition of Immokalee Workers (the “Coalition”) is a worker-driven 
community organization that represents low-wage workers in the 
tomato, and other harvest industries in Florida.316 The Coalition has won 
several successes for its members and workers in the Florida agricultural 
industries, including industry-wide raises of thirteen to twenty-five 
percent for workers, assisting with government investigation, and 
prosecution of involuntary servitude in the industry.317 Additionally, and 
as discussed below, it also made a serious contribution to improved labor 
conditions by starting the Fair Food Program.318 Its successes have been 
so considerable that it has won accolades from the United Nations319 and 
the White House.320 
Part of the reason for the Coalition’s success was that it understood 
the economics of the supply chain. In its early years, the Coalition had 
unsuccessfully attempted to pressure Florida growers to increase tomato 
harvesting piece rates.321 It began to see success when it realized that the 
problem did not begin and end with the Florida growers. Instead, the 
Florida growers occupied one tier in a more complex supply chain that 
ended with a consolidation of retail power at the top.322 The combined 
buying power of the retail giants at the top of the food chain exerted 
significant downward pressure on supplier prices, which resulted in 
declining wages and working conditions for the workers at the bottom of 
the supply chain.323 
This recognition of the economic reality of the supply chain led the 
Coalition to adopt a different strategy that aimed at structural change in 
the industry. The Coalition launched the Campaign for Fair Food in 
order to incentivize the actors at the top of the supply chain to change 
316. About CIW, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/about/ (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2014). 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Greg Asbed, UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights ‘Impressed’ with Fair 
Food Program, HUFFINGTON POST (May 16, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
greg-asbed/un-working-group-on-busin_b_3222906.html. 
320. Fair Food Program, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/fair-food-
program/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
321. Greg Asbed & Sean Sellers, The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, Verifiable and 
Sustainable Change for Farmworkers, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 43 (2013). 
322. Id. at 43–45. 
323. Id.; Our Brands, YUM!, http://www.yum.com/brands/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); see also 
FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM: REPORT 2011–2013, at 7 (2013), 
available at http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/reports/FFP_2011-13_web_v1.0.pdf. 
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their operations in a way that would produce beneficial trickle-down 
effects.324 The Coalition successfully negotiated a series of binding legal 
agreements with food retail giants such as Yum Brands (Taco Bell, 
KFC, Pizza Hut), McDonald’s Corporation, Burger King Corporation, 
Subway, Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s, and Chipotle.325 These fair food 
agreements commit the retailers to paying a “penny per pound” price 
premium for more fairly produced tomatoes.326 Retailers also commit to 
purchasing tomatoes only from growers who comply with the Fair Food 
Code of Conduct.327 This condition creates market incentives for 
growers to abide by the terms of the Code of Conduct.328 The Fair Food 
Code of Conduct is distinguishable from many corporate codes of 
conduct because it “was born in discussions among workers in 
Immokalee, shared with consumers in churches and schools across the 
country, shaped in negotiations with participating retailers, and honed 
into the working document it is today in an intense loop of 
implementation, feedback, and modification in partnership with Florida 
tomato growers.”329 
The Code of Conduct is at the heart of the Fair Food Program, which 
covers over ninety percent of the Florida tomato industry and “is the 
only industry-wide social responsibility program” currently in U.S. 
agriculture.330 The key elements of the Fair Food Program include 
(a) worker-to-worker education that informs workers of their rights and 
responsibilities so they can identify problematic practices, (b) 24-hour 
complaint line and complaint investigation and resolution process, 
(c) audits, and (d) enforcement through the market incentives in the fair 
food agreements whereby growers who do not abide by the terms of the 
Code of Conduct lose the business of the retailers who have signed 
agreements with the Coalition.331 
At a surface level, the Fair Food Program (FFP) may resemble other 
corporate social responsibility programs because the FFP also includes a 
code of conduct and utilizes audits. But the FFP is an example of a 
324. Asbed & Sellers, supra note 321, at 44. 
325. Id.; see also Highlights: Selected National and International Recognition of the CIW and Its 
Members, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/highlights/ (last visited Aug. 
26, 2014). 





331. Id. at 46; see also FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 323, at 10–12. 
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Worker-driven Social Responsibility Program (WSR) that is an 
alternative to the CSR programs that are generally designed by 
corporations.332 The FFP’s worker-led characteristic has important 
ramifications for the operation of the program and differs from CSR in 
the following critical ways:333 
• Re-definition of the problem from a public relations issue to a 
human rights issue;334 
• Shift from generic “Vendor Standards” to specific codes of 
conduct that reflect the bad practices in an industry;335 
• Shift from audit-based monitoring to participatory and 
complaint based monitoring. The Fair Food Program’s 
worker education informs workers of their rights and provides 
avenues for workers to notify other actors when those rights 
are infringed. The complaint line is staffed by the actors who 
investigate the complaints. The Program also relies on third-
party audits but their auditors are required to speak with at 
least fifty percent of the workers on an audited farm and 
sometimes the percentage can be as high as ninety percent. 
These percentages are in stark contrast to regular CSR audits 
that only engage approximately ten to twenty percent of 
workers. The increased attention to workers should reduce the 
risk of audit evasion by growers. Under WSR, “workers are 
the lead actors in the monitoring of the Fair Food 
Program”;336 
• Shift in enforcement by the creation of market incentives for 
compliance.337 
The Fair Food Program is successful because it utilizes the strengths 
of actors at each tier of the supply chain.338 Through their large 
purchasing orders, retailers provide strong incentives for compliance by 
their growers.339 Although the Fair Food Program initially sounds like a 
narrative between workers and retailers (the two ends of the supply 
332. Greg Asbed, Worker-Driven Social Responsibility (WSR): A New Idea for a New Century, 







338. Asbed & Sellers, supra note 321, at 47. 
339. Id. 
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chain), it is important to remember the value of the grower-suppliers 
who operate in the middle. These suppliers initially resisted the fair food 
initiatives and their resistance compromised the effectiveness of the 
program.340 The Florida Tomato Growers Exchange represents ninety 
percent of Florida’s tomato growers.341 It threatened to impose 
significant fines against any member-grower who participated in the 
program.342 As a result, the price premium that buyers paid had no way 
of getting to the workers because the buyers did not pay the premiums to 
the workers directly and the premiums did not pass through entities such 
as the Coalition that were outside the buyer’s regular supply chain.343 
The premiums sat in escrow while the Exchange’s members refused to 
cooperate.344 The situation changed in 2010 when the Coalition and the 
Exchange reached an agreement to expand the Fair Food Program 
throughout the Florida tomato industry; the premiums began to flow to 
the workers.345 One reason for the growers’ eventual cooperation is that 
the Fair Food Program does not require that growers bear the entire cost 
of change.346 
If public actors are to replicate the successes of the Coalition within 
other value chains, their first challenge will be to determine who is in the 
best position to encourage private firms to change their CSR strategies 
from unilateral to bilateral approaches. The public actor’s first step 
toward adopting a reflexive law approach is to recognize its own 
limitations to achieving its objective. Second, the public actor needs to 
identify an intermediary stakeholder who may be in a better position to 
exercise leverage over multinational buyers to get them to change their 
CSR approaches. In the example of the Immokalee workers, the pressure 
for change at the top came from strategic alliances between farmworkers 
and consumers.347 The public actor’s efforts, therefore, should be spent 
in helping these intermediary stakeholders maximize their leverage over 
the buyer firms. 
In the transnational context, suppliers, frustrated by the dominant 
approaches to implementing CSR, may be important intermediary 
340. Editorial, One Penny More a Pound, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at A22 [hereinafter One 
Penny More a Pound]. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 323, at 39. 
344. One Penny More a Pound, supra note 340. 
345. FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 323, at 39. 
346. Id. at 12. 
347. About CIW, supra note 316. 
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stakeholders who may have potential to change CSR practices. After 
studying four case studies of CSR implementation in overseas facilities, 
one group of researchers concluded that “while governance pressures 
emanating from the global value chain were the leading drivers behind 
the adoption of collective action CSR initiatives in the four cases 
[studied], local institutions were instrumental in the effective 
implementation of collective action responses across all four cases.”348 
In particular, “[t]hese collective bodies were critical in the 
implementation of CSR monitoring schemes that could ensure 
compliance and improve their industry’s standing in the eyes of 
stakeholders in Northern-buyer markets.”349 
The involvement of local actors brought several advantages to CSR 
implementation. In the Kenyan cut flower industry, for example, the 
involvement of leading local industry associations in the Horticultural 
and Ethical Business Initiative (HEBI) meant that some of the usual 
constraints of traditional monitoring could be overcome.350 The issues 
“associated with tick-box approaches, little time spent in monitoring at 
local pack-houses and farms and the use of expensive auditors with 
limited knowledge of local contexts” were ameliorated with 
participatory social auditing that involved more participation by 
workers.351 This participation was important because it “rais[ed] their 
awareness and uncover[ed] less visible issues such as gender 
discrimination and sexual harassment.”352 Participation by local industry 
associations can also be important to secure the cooperation of the 
industry’s individual members.353 
Improving CSR compliance in global value chains, therefore, may 
require empowerment of local actors. For example, in Cambodia, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the funding for the responses by local 
industry was provided by international agencies, including the U.S. 
Department of Labor.354 California and other public actors could 
similarly seek to empower local industry associations so that the latter 
may be able to counter-balance the influence of buyers and push for a 
348. Peter Lund-Thomsen & Khalid Nadvi, Global Value Chains, Local Collective Action and 




351. Id. at 7–8. 
352. Id. at 8. 
353. Id. at 7. 
354. Id. at 6. 
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new approach to CSR strategies. Such an approach is consistent with a 
reflexive law strategy because reflexive law seeks to mediate key 
relationships between private parties with an eye to counter-balancing 
the distribution of power in those relationships: “[R]eflexive law 
encourages lawmakers to consider how to motivate and facilitate the 
creation of private networks of countervailing power to existing 
powerful economic interests. It . . . challenges regulators to explore 
possibilities to influence interactions between global capital and these 
burgeoning forces of private antagonistic actors.”355 
D. Summary 
The initiatives discussed above are suggestions for fully decentralized 
regulation that address the weaknesses of incentives and governance 
explained in this Article. Each of these initiatives attempts to correct 
misaligned incentives in the value chain. However, this goal could have 
been attempted through traditional command and control regulation. For 
example, California could have required that all covered entities 
eliminate audit manipulation in their value chains, but such a mandate 
may prove difficult to enforce because of limitations of proximity, 
resources, jurisdiction, and information. Alternatively, California could 
have mandated that covered entities change the governance of their 
value chains from market-based to relational forms of governance. Such 
a regulation is unlikely to occur because it would not be politically 
popular. Finally, California could have required that covered entities 
change their CSR strategies from unilateral approaches to bilateral 
partnerships. Such an approach seems similarly unlikely because public 
regulators that have required social reporting, such as California and 
Denmark, have opted to require that companies disclose their CSR 
policies but have not identified the substantive requirements of these 
policies or even required that a company adopt one if it has not already 
done so. It is for these reasons that a reflexive approach is necessary to 
correct misaligned incentives in the value chain. 
Second, it is difficult to prescribe solutions that can be applied across 
industries. This is because the “value” in these value chains is derived 
from different sources depending on type of product, product life-cycle, 
and branded or non-branded nature of the firm. Rana Plaza and Foxconn 
share similar risks for worker abuse, but that is where the similarities 
end. The electronics made at Foxconn derive a significant portion of 
355. Doorey, supra note 252, at 371–72. 
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their value from the innovative concept and design.356 The firms who 
sell these products make profits because they are offering consumers 
something new or something better. This is not the same story for the 
garments produced at Rana Plaza, where the garments derive their value 
from the brand name that is stitched on the label or by controlling the 
costs of making them. The firms who sell these products, therefore, 
generally make profit by keeping the cost of labor down. This distinction 
is informed by the following two qualifications. 
Even within the electronics industry, value will shift from innovation 
to cost depending on the stage of the product’s life-cycle and the number 
of competitors in the field. With new technology, the firm faces little to 
no competition and the value for the product is derived from innovation. 
As this technology becomes mundane and new firms enter the market, 
the value that the firm extracts will depend less on innovation and more 
on controlling costs.357 
Finally, branded firms extract part of the value for their product from 
the premium that consumers pay for that brand name. Nike learned a 
long time ago that saving costs at the expense of its reputation is a hard 
bargain. It therefore invested in implementing its corporate code of 
conduct, even including on-site monitors.358 But not all brand names 
have learned Nike’s lesson. Apple is in the midst of its own painful 
education and may be more willing now to emulate the example of the 
branded shoe firms.359 Similarly, a brand name clothing company whose 
garments are made at Rana Plaza may also be willing to invest in CSR 
policies and share that premium—albeit a small one—with its suppliers. 
These drivers change, however, when we move from the branded 
market to the low-cost discount market where firms survive on beating 
price and not on their brand name. When the value from the value chain 
only comes from controlling cost in a competitive environment, there 
will be greater downward pressure on prices with all the attendant risks 
for the workers who operate under those conditions. More importantly, 
the drivers for reform will differ. In industries that rely on technology, a 
driver for better labor practices is access to a skilled labor force. In 
356. See Varian, supra note 62; Supply Chains, supra note 56. 
357. For example, Toshiba-Matsushita Display supplied the display used in Apple’s video iPod. 
Dedrick et al., supra note 63, at 12. This component was one of the few high-value items, allowing 
Toshiba-Matsushita to capture an average gross margin of approximately twenty-nine percent. 
However, competition from Korean and Taiwanese entrants reduced Toshiba-Matsushita’s market 
rank and contributed to a business environment of “rapid price deterioration.” Id. 
358. Lim & Phillips, supra note 194, at 147. 
359. See supra notes 98−100 and accompanying text. 
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branded markets, the firms will be sensitive to reputational damage. 
These drivers are absent when we shift to the non-branded, non-
innovative industries where price is determinative of value. 
Finally, the suggestions shared here are meant to improve currently 
prevailing practices. None of the suggestions will eradicate labor abuses 
in value chains. Moreover, like other CSR strategies, they may also be 
vulnerable to the problem of unintended consequences.360 Although the 
objective is to improve the conditions of overseas workers, these 
suggested initiatives may have the effect of negatively impacting the 
welfare of some groups of workers. For example, effective 
implementation of CSR may necessitate re-organization of production in 
the value chain in order to facilitate improved monitoring and oversight. 
When Nike intensified its monitoring efforts in Sialkot, Pakistan, where 
many of Nike’s hand-stitched soccer balls are produced, it also changed 
the organization of production.361 Previously, this industry had trended 
towards decentralized production in rural, home-based sites that made it 
more difficult to monitor compliance with standards, especially 
involving child labor.362 In order to improve monitoring of labor 
conditions, Nike required that all production occur within designated 
stitching centers.363 Although such a change improved Nike’s ability to 
monitor standards, it likely had an effect on the ability of workers—
predominantly female—to earn an income while still performing 
household duties, such as childcare. The centralization of production 
precipitated by Nike’s CSR strategy may have made such a balance 
more difficult for these female workers. Additionally, accompanying 
improved CSR is the looming threat of business flight from countries 
that begin to demand more from their Western clients.364 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presents a framework for improving the effectiveness of 
efforts to reform the global value chain. The key advantage of this 
framework is the incentives that it offers to neglected segments of the 
360. See Sabel et al., supra note 1, at 14. 
361. Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, supra note 31, at 210. 
362. See id. at 209–10. 
363. Khalid Nadvi, Global Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of Global Value 
Chains, 8 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 323, 335–36 (2008). 
364. See Narine, supra note 148, at 391–92 (explaining that opponents of the Dodd-Frank conflict 
minerals reporting provision fear that the law will lead firms to source their minerals from other 
locations and leave local artisanal miners without any form of livelihood). 
 
                                                     
08 - Parella_Ready for Publication.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:56 PM 
818 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:747 
value chain: upstream suppliers. Current CSR efforts are compromised 
by their failure to incentivize these actors to cooperate. As a result, 
efforts to improve transparency and, consequently, exert upward 
pressure on conditions will fail so long as suppliers fail to “buy-in” to 
these efforts. Improving the global value chain requires recognizing the 
diversity of actors and interests involved and offering incentives that 
apply throughout the chain and not just the buying end. 
The failure to win supplier cooperation is a result of more than just a 
weakness in incentives. It also stems from limitations to transnational 
governance and the organization of multi-stakeholder activity. Individual 
stakeholders are limited in their ability to influence suppliers directly. 
That is why it is important for them to distinguish between target firms 
and intermediary stakeholders in order to transmit incentives effectively. 
The combination of improved incentives and greater coordination will 
not ensure an ideal value chain but it can reduce the likelihood that we 
will witness another Rana Plaza or Foxconn. 
 
 
